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Administrative States: Beyond Presidential 
Administration 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen* 
Presidential administration is more entrenched and expansive than ever. 
Most significant policymaking comes from agency action rather than legislation. 
Courts endorse “the presence of Presidential power” in agency decisionmaking. 
Scholars give up on external checks and balances and take presidential direction 
as a starting point. Yet presidential administration is also quite fragile. Even as 
the Court embraces presidential control, it has been limiting the administrative 
domain over which the president presides. And when presidents drive agency 
action in a polarized age, their policies are not only immediately contested but 
also readily reversed by their successors. 
States complicate each piece of this story. In critical respects, federalism 
further strengthens presidential administration. Waivers, grants, nonpreemption 
of state law, and other intergovernmental techniques enable presidents to 
effectuate policy agendas when federal agencies lack sufficient authority. States 
also furnish durability because their policies may outlast a president’s tenure 
when federal policies do not. At the same time, federalism diversifies 
administration and broadens its representative base. Defenses of presidential 
power as “accountable” and “effective” sound increasingly empty, if not 
dangerously autocratic. Yet it is easier to condemn presidential administration 
than to locate alternatives that connect the administrative state to electoral 
politics and representative institutions as well as to expertise and deliberation. 
Because state legislators and governors may furnish these connections, plural 
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Introduction 
Although the reach of federal agencies has never been greater, nearly 
every significant administrative action finds itself vulnerable to legal 
challenge, political reversal, or both. The Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Clean Power Plan,1 the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)2 and Deferred Action for 
 
1. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see Press 
Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean 
Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015
/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/T8LL-3W46] (“[T]oday, 
we’re here to announce America’s Clean Power Plan—a plan two years in the making, and the 
single most important step America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change.”). 
2. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1 (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter DACA Memo], 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-
to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2XG-HUCY]; see Press Release, White House Office of 
the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration 
[https://perma.cc/4TK9-CC25] (reporting President Obama’s remarks announcing the DACA 
program). 
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Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) initiatives,3 
and the Federal Communications Commission’s net-neutrality rules4 
involved distinct subjects; they involved distinct agencies, from a multi-
member New Deal commission to the newest Cabinet agency; and they 
involved distinct forms of agency action, from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking to guidance. But all seem to have met the same unhappy fate. 
Even before President Obama left office, these agency actions had been 
challenged in court,5 and the Trump Administration has now withdrawn each 
of the policies.6 The same is true of numerous other Obama-era policies, from 
 
3. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León 
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. 3 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter DAPA 
Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action
_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5M6-KVLH]; see Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, 
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-
nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/4JEV-ZDXF] (reporting President Obama’s remarks 
announcing the DAPA program). 
4. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (codified at 
47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8 & 20); see also In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 
5601, 5603–04 (2015) (“grounding our open Internet rules in multiple sources of legal authority”); 
Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, WHITE HOUSE, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/4CLF-8Q84] (outlining President 
Obama’s plan for “a Free and Open Internet”). 
5. Plaintiffs argued that the Clean Power Plan exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority and did 
not merit Chevron deference. Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 35, West Virginia 
v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016); see West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) 
(staying Clean Power Plan pending review in the D.C. Circuit). Plaintiffs argued that DACA and 
DAPA ran afoul of procedural requirements and usurped Congress’s power. See Texas v. United 
States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) 
(enjoining DAPA and expansion of DACA); see also Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 
2015) (dismissing challenge to DACA for lack of standing). Plaintiffs argued that the net-neutrality 
orders of 2010 and 2015 exceeded the FCC’s statutory authority. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 
825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting challenge to FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order); 
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating antidiscrimination and antiblocking 
requirements of FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order). 
6. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July 8, 2019) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60) (repealing the Clean Power Plan and promulgating a different rule for electric 
utilities); Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at 47 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 8 & 20) (revoking net-neutrality rules); Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., et al. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca 
[https://perma.cc/5BDT-96B3] (rescinding the DACA Memo); Memorandum from John F. Kelly, 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Comm’r., U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D74-ATBP] (rescinding the DAPA 
Memo). Several of these Trump Administration actions are now, in turn, being challenged in court. 
See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem.) 
(granting certiorari to consider legality of DACA rescission); Mozilla Corp v. FCC, No. 18-1051, 
2019 WL 4777860 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2019) (largely upholding the FCC’s Restoring Internet 
Freedom Order); Petition for Review, New York v. EPA, No. 19-1165 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2019), 
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the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing regulation,7 to the Department of Education’s 
guidance regarding transgender students,8 to the Department of Labor’s 
fiduciary duty rule,9 and more. The most straightforward, and commonly 
offered, answer to the question of where these administrative decisions stand 
is that they have been “gutted or [are] on the road to being gutted.”10 
That is not, however, a complete answer. When the EPA announced the 
Clean Power Plan’s repeal, half of the states were already meeting their 
targets,11 and many are now taking additional steps to advance the Plan’s 
commitment to renewable energy.12 Numerous sanctuary states and cities are 
refusing to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement that would target 
DACA- and DAPA-eligible immigrants,13 and some have passed legislation 
 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-08/documents/stofny_19-1165_pfr
_08132019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B58-ELLZ] (petitioning the Court to find unlawful the EPA’s 
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan). 
7. E.g., Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining and Enhancements, 83 Fed. Reg. 
40713 (proposed Aug. 16, 2018) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903) 
(publishing advance notice of proposed rulemaking and stating that the Affirmatively Furthering 
Fair Housing rule promulgated in 2015 is “ineffective” and “highly prescriptive”). 
8. Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Feb. 22, 2017), http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.docx [https://perma.cc/FJ4X-
6REN] (rescinding Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 3 
(May 13, 2016)). 
9. See, e.g., Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule to the Sec’y of Labor (Feb. 3, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-
duty-rule/ [https://perma.cc/FQ5D-FKH3] (directing the Secretary of Labor to review the Fiduciary 
Duty Rule with an eye to rescinding or revising it); Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2018) (vacating the Fiduciary Duty Rule). 
10. Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated 
Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 607 (2018); see 
also, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Reconstructing the Administrative State in an Era of Economic and 
Democratic Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1671, 1700 (2018) (book review) (“The incoming Trump 
Administration quickly reversed each of these [Obama Administration] regulatory initiatives.”). 
11. E.g., Brad Plumer & Nadia Popovich, How Will the Clean Power Plan Repeal Change 
Carbon Emissions for Your State?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2017/10/10/climate/clean-power-plan-emissions-your-state.html [https://perma.cc
/3AHS-WY8F]. 
12. E.g., Climate Action Plan to Reduce Pollution, H.B. 19-1261, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Colo. 2019); S.P. 457, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); S.B. 254, 80th Sess., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 
2019); Energy Transition Act, S.B. 489, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019); New York State Climate 
Leadership and Community Protection Act, S. 6599, 2019–2020 Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 
5116, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); The 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018, S.B. 100, 
2017–2018 Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); A3723, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). See generally 
States United for Climate Action, U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, https://www.usclimatealliance.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/BH8V-TP6A] (describing alliance of 25 governors who have committed to 
implementing “policies that advance the goals of the Paris Agreement”); States & Tribes, WE ARE 
STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/states-tribes [https://perma.cc/LB66-7KKD] (“States 
are . . . taking up the mantle of climate leadership.”). 
13. E.g., Protect Colorado Residents from Federal Government Overreach, H.B. 19-1124, 72d 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); An Act Concerning the Trust Act, Pub. Act No. 19-20, 
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maintaining particular protections for DACA recipients.14 States have 
responded to the FCC’s actions by “restoring” net neutrality as a matter of 
state law.15 They have likewise assumed custody of Obama-era housing, 
labor, education, and other policies.16 
This Article seeks to make sense of this broader landscape and to probe 
its possibilities. Nearly two decades after then-Professor Elena Kagan 
announced that we were living “in an era of presidential administration”17—
 
2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2019); S.B. 5497, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); 
California Values Act, S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); Illinois TRUST Act, Pub. 
Act No. 100-463, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); H.B. 3464, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 2017); see also Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1160 (Mass. 2017) 
(“Massachusetts law provides no authority for Massachusetts court officers to arrest and hold an 
individual solely on the basis of a Federal civil immigration detainer . . . .”). 
14. E.g., S.B. 1563, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018) (exempting certain 
undocumented students from paying nonresident tuition at public universities); H. 7982, 2018 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2018) (“The division of motor vehicles shall issue an operator’s or 
chauffeur’s license . . . to every qualifying applicant, including, but not limited to, any current or 
past recipient of a grant of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program.”); see Press Release, Oregon Governor’s Office, Governor Brown Signs DACA 
Legislation at May Day Celebration (May 1, 2018), https://www.oregon.gov/newsroom/pages
/NewsDetail.aspx?newsid=2697 [https://perma.cc/82SM-5ZSC] (“Governor Brown signed Senate 
Bill 1563 that makes it possible for eligible students without documentation attending Oregon 
colleges and universities to continue to qualify for in-state tuition, with or without a federal DACA 
program.”); Press Release, Gina M. Raimondo, Governor of R.I., Raimondo Signs Legislation 
Protecting Dreamers (June 18, 2018), https://www.ri.gov/press/view/33496 [https://perma.cc
/6DKE-D8ME] (“Rhode Island Dreamers with current or past DACA status will now be able to 
apply for and receive drivers licenses in Rhode Island regardless of what happens to the program at 
the federal level.”). 
15. See, e.g., California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act, S.B. 822, 2017–
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018); Act 169, 
2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); H.B. 2282 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). See 
generally Heather Morton, Net Neutrality 2019 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG. (Oct. 1, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/net-
neutrality-2019-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/JZG4-PP87] (compiling adopted and introduced 
net-neutrality legislation from twenty-nine states); Alex Johnson, California Enacts Net Neutrality 
Bill, DOJ Counters with Lawsuit, NBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech
/internet/gov-jerry-brown-signs-bill-restore-net-neutrality-california-n915221 [https://perma.cc
/5ZKB-87R6] (describing the California law as “restor[ing] net neutrality protections that President 
Donald Trump’s Federal Communications Commission killed late last year”). 
16. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 686, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (introducing an 
affirmatively furthering fair housing obligation into state law following the Trump Administration’s 
decision not to implement the federal affirmatively furthering fair housing regulation); S.B. 383, 
79th Sess., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) (restoring the Department of Labor’s Obama-era fiduciary rule 
as a matter of state law); Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., and MaryEllen Elia, 
N.Y. Comm’r of Educ. (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.nysed.gov/common/nysed/files/nysed-oag-
joint-guidance-letter-2-28-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ66-8Z5H] (informing “school districts 
across New York State that – irrespective of the federal government’s recent announcement [that it 
would no longer investigate civil rights complaints from transgender students denied bathroom 
access] – they have independent duties to protect transgender students from discrimination and 
harassment in their schools and at all school functions”). 
17. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) 
(announcing and defending “an era of presidential administration,” defined by the president’s 
“primacy in setting the direction and influencing the outcome of administrative process”). 
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and some eight decades after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
established the basic architecture for a far-reaching, presidentially 
superintended administrative state—presidential administration is stronger 
than ever. Presidents rely on federal agencies to further their agendas; most 
significant policymaking comes from agency action rather than legislation.18 
Courts limit agency officials’ insulation from presidential appointment and 
removal and bless “the presence of Presidential power” in agency 
policymaking.19 Scholars who defend the administrative state take 
presidential direction as their starting point. Largely giving up on external 
checks and balances, they propose tempering presidential control through 
bureaucracy and administrative procedure.20 
As the Obama–Trump transition illustrates, however, presidential 
administration is also quite fragile. When presidents drive administrative 
decisionmaking in a polarized age, their policy choices are immediately 
contested and readily subject to reversal.21 The very political dynamics that 
yield more aggressive presidential administration also jeopardize its outputs. 
With a new election, presidential administration may cannibalize itself. 
Even as the Supreme Court has increasingly embraced presidential 
control, moreover, it has been limiting the domain of agency decisionmaking. 
Presidential power, as it has appeared in recent cases, is part of the latest 
attack on today’s administrative state, not an aspect of its defense.22 If this 
doctrinal development persists, presidential administration will not plausibly 
be associated with a “pro-regulatory governing agenda”;23 courts may well 
 
18. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of 
Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1968 (2015) (“By the end of the twentieth century 
and accelerating at the beginning of the twenty-first, the President and the vastly expanded executive 
branch have become the most powerful engine of government.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling 
Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 698 (2016) (“Obama has elevated White House 
control over agencies’ regulatory activity to its highest level ever . . . .”); Daniel A. Farber, 
Presidential Administration Under Trump 4 (Aug. 8, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015591 [https://perma.cc/6K4U-NTTZ] 
(“Although borrowing governance methods from his predecessors, [Trump] may be going to greater 
extremes in the frequency and degree of his reliance on those methods, so that what was previously 
exceptional seems now to be a more central part of governance.”). 
19. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (quoting Sierra Club v. 
Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 
(2018) (holding that administrative law judges are “Officers of the United States” who must be 
appointed by the president, a court of law, or a head of department); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010) (holding that “double for-cause” 
removal protections infringe Article II’s vesting of executive power in the president). 
20. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: 
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017); infra subpart II(B). 
21. See, e.g., Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10; Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, 
Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3348569 [https://perma.cc/3ZV2-2GVS] (describing Trump’s particularly 
aggressive rollbacks of Obama-era regulations). 
22. See infra subpart II(A). 
23. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249. 
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accept presidential control over agency decisions, but they are likely to deem 
“pro-regulatory” decisions themselves beyond agencies’ authority. 
To better understand today’s potent-yet-fragile presidential 
administration, we need to bring the states into view. The president’s 
effectuation of a domestic policy agenda through administrative means24 is, 
in fact, still more powerful than a review of federal agency decisions alone 
suggests. States critically supplement federal agency policymaking and may 
succeed where federal agencies ultimately fail; the legacy of Obama’s 
initiatives rests almost entirely in state hands. 
Although twenty-first-century political polarization throws this state 
role into sharp relief, federalism has always been a part of presidential 
administration. Kagan’s own principal examples involved state 
implementation of policies that federal agencies lacked sufficient authority 
to carry out.25 And the basic “infrastructure”26 for presidential administration 
emerged alongside New Deal cooperative federalism. Roosevelt’s Brownlow 
Committee appreciated that even a robust federal administration would have 
to collaborate with state and local governments to achieve certain policy 
ends. It further recognized that federalism both bolstered and tempered the 
argument for presidential power: intergovernmental coordination demanded 
greater presidential control over federal administration, the Brownlow Report 
insisted, but geographical decentralization, in turn, meant that concentrating 
power in the presidency need not amount to “overcentralization.”27 State, 
local, and regional implementation of presidential policies could bring an 
executive-centric administrative state “nearer to the people themselves.”28 
Presidential administration has changed substantially since the 1930s, 
but this foundational sketch continues to shed light on contemporary 
practices. In particular, if states extend the reach of presidential 
 
24. Kagan’s definition of the phenomenon was somewhat narrower, focused on the president’s 
“comparative primacy [relative to Congress, the judiciary, external constituencies, and agency staff] 
in setting the direction and influencing the outcome of administrative process,” id. at 2246, although 
she gestured to this broader understanding as well, see, e.g., id. at 2248 (“Faced for most of his time 
in office with a hostile Congress but eager to show progress on domestic issues, Clinton and his 
White House staff turned to the bureaucracy to achieve, to the extent it could, the full panoply of 
his domestic policy goals.”). For discussion of the broadening of the understanding, see infra 
subpart I(B). 
25. See infra notes 172–77 and accompanying text. 
26. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2275. 
27. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 26 (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW REPORT]. 
28. Id. at 30. The Brownlow Report states: 
A general principle that may be laid down is that the decentralization should be 
geographical and that more and more of the administrative work of the Executive 
Branch be carried on in the field in regional units set up to cover all parts of the 
United States. In this way the Government will be brought nearer to the people 
themselves and by this regional organization the Federal Government may the 
better cooperate with State and local governments in the conduct of its affairs. 
Id.; see infra Part III. 
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administration, so too can they render it more palatable. Defenses of 
executive power as “accountable” and “effective” increasingly seem not only 
empty but dangerously autocratic.29 Yet it is easier to condemn presidential 
administration than to find plausible alternatives—modes of governance that 
connect the administrative state to representative democracy and politics as 
well as to deliberation and expertise. States diversify presidential 
policymaking, both amplifying and limiting any particular president’s 
agenda. They also furnish multiple tethers to electoral politics and the broader 
public. In a political era defined by a wide-ranging federal executive branch, 
limited congressional capacity, and fractious partisanship, shifting our focus 
from a unitary administrative state to multiple administrative states offers a 
better way to think about presidential administration and American 
government more generally. 
I. The Rise and Rise of Presidential Administration 
Although “presidential administration” has come to denote a wide range 
of practices, the version Kagan described in 2001 was relatively narrow in its 
conception of both “presidential” and “administration.” The president 
superintended decisions Congress had delegated to federal agencies through 
mechanisms of centralization, including regulatory review and directives. In 
the first decades of the twenty-first century, presidential administration has 
grown more capacious as it has incorporated strategies of politicization as 
well as centralization. The rise of an executive-centered party system means 
that “presidential” need not require activity by the president herself but 
encompasses a partisan platform carried out by political officials across 
federal agencies.30 “Administration” has also grown both more substantial 
and more autonomous: confronting partisan polarization, legislative gridlock, 
and aging statutes, presidents have relied heavily on agencies to set domestic 
policy, and commentators have defended presidentially directed 
policymaking more and more attenuated from legislative authorization. 
A. Delegation and Deference 
In the late twentieth century, presidential administration consisted 
principally of tools and strategies to control rulemaking, which had recently 
 
29. Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 171 
(2018) (“‘[P]residentialism’ has the vices of its virtues. . . . ‘Democracy’ should mean more than 
that we elect our dictators.”). 
30. See Sidney M. Milkis & Nicholas Jacobs, ‘I Alone Can Fix It’ Donald Trump, the 
Administrative Presidency, and Hazards of Executive-Centered Partisanship, 15 FORUM 583, 609 
(2017); cf. Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in 
Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 82–83 (2016) (“The ultimate holders of power in American 
democracy are not government institutions but democratic interests: the coalitions of policy-seeking 
political actors—voters, parties, officials, interest groups—that compete for control of these 
institutions and direct their decisionmaking.”). 
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become the most significant form of administrative action.31 Building on his 
predecessors’ innovations, President Reagan established regulatory review 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as a central part of the 
rulemaking process.32 President Clinton slightly modified but maintained 
such regulatory review33 and also sought to spur and take ownership of 
administrative action through directives to agencies and personal 
appropriation of their actions.34 
This wave of presidential administration thus focused on centralization, 
that is, on White House control over agency actions.35 As compared to its 
subsequent development, such presidential administration was relatively 
modest. For one thing, the very idea of centralization posited agencies as 
critically distinct from the president: the president could seek to drive or 
constrain agency action, but it was not to be assumed that agencies would act 
in accordance with presidential preferences; they had to be closely monitored 
and subject to controls. For another, this version of presidential 
administration did not displace Congress as lawmaker: it asserted the 
president’s power over administrative agencies but emphasized that these 
agencies were only making policy pursuant to power delegated by Congress 
in the first instance. 
Both of these limits were apparent in the period’s leading doctrinal and 
theoretical accounts. Although courts had deferred to agency decisions long 
 
31. See HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER 103 (5th ed. 1998) (“In the past 
the contest between the president and the Congress for power to direct executive policies and actions 
focused mainly on issues related to executive branch structure. The contest has now shifted to a new 
arena with jurisdiction over the review and control of regulations providing the major source of 
conflict.”). 
32. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 130–31 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); 
see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 
547–49 (1989); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080–82 (1986). 
33. Exec. Order No. 12866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). 
Subsequent presidents have also maintained regulatory review. See Exec. Order No. 13777, 3 C.F.R. 
293 (2018) (President Donald Trump); Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) (President 
Barack Obama); Exec. Order No. 13422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008) (President George W. Bush). 
34. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2281–319 (describing presidential administration under 
Clinton). 
35. See generally Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 235 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (describing techniques of 
centralization and politicization). There has long been debate about whether OMB, and within it 
OIRA, the agency responsible for regulatory review, can fairly be equated with the president. 
Compare, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1307 (2006) (“OIRA is not the President.”) (emphasis omitted), 
and Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 
101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342 (2013) (“OIRA review will rarely result in greater presidential 
oversight.”), with Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 131 (2014) (“In our view, centralized regulatory review is fundamentally 
about presidential control over the administrative state.”). This and other limits of centralization 
have placed more pressure on strategies of politicization in recent years. See infra subpart I(B). 
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before 1984, Chevron36 newly proposed that deference was warranted 
because of agencies’ connection to the president: 
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely 
upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform 
its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .37 
For the Court, delegation and deference worked hand-in-hand. The 
primary contrast the opinion drew was between the constituency-less 
judiciary and the other two “political branches.”38 The Court appreciated that 
Congress would confer substantial policymaking authority on the executive 
branch. It did not seek to revive a strong nondelegation doctrine, nor did it 
suggest that agencies were transmission belts merely carrying out 
congressional instruction or technocrats merely applying expertise to 
apolitical problems.39 Instead of cleaving bureaucracy from politics, the 
Court recognized the president as supplying the necessary democratic 
connection. Moving away from the interest-representation model that had 
sought to legitimize agency decisionmaking with reference to a diverse 
public,40 the Court turned to the president as a single individual who could 
represent the people.41 
The notion of accountability also underlay the most prominent defense 
of presidential administration. Before Kagan’s Presidential Administration, 
 
36. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
37. Id. at 865. 
38. Id. at 866. 
39. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675–78 (1975) (describing the transmission belt and expertise models of 
administrative legitimacy). 
40. For instance, courts in the 1970s had opened notice-and-comment rulemaking to public 
participation on the front end and to public challenge on the back end. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1970) (standing); McKart v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 185, 197–99 (1969) (exhaustion); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 
(1967) (pre-enforcement review); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 
251–52 (2d Cir. 1977) (notice and comment); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(en banc) (notice and comment). 
41. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 183 (1997) (“The Chevron mystique flows from this promise that the 
ordinary act of statutory interpretation can advance the larger process of reconciling agencies with 
constitutional democracy.”). See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 490 (2003) (“The 
presidential control model seeks to ensure that administrative policy decisions reflect the 
preferences of the one person who speaks for the entire nation. In this way, it attempts to legitimate 
administrative policy decisions, through presidential politics, on the ground that they are responsive 
to public preferences.”). 
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a number of scholars had noted the trend toward presidential centralization,42 
and some had insisted on the constitutional imperative of a unitary 
executive.43 But these accounts generally focused on disciplining the 
administrative state. On the heels of Clinton’s presidency, Kagan offered a 
more robust, pro-regulatory account of presidential control.44 For her, the 
question was one of statutory interpretation, not Article II command.45 
Despite this constitutional modesty, however, her account was normatively 
emphatic: presidential control rendered administration democratically 
responsible. Democratic accountability was in part retrospective46 but largely 
prospective and procedural, grounded in the president’s consideration of 
national preferences and the public’s monitoring of transparent presidential 
choices.47 
Although the idea that “‘We, the People’ control the bureaucracy” 
through the president was subject to forceful criticism from the start,48 
 
42. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 219 (1993) (“In recent years, the particular focus has been on presidential 
oversight, in part as a result of the increasingly systematic efforts of every President since Richard 
Nixon to gain control of the federal bureaucracy.”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1994) (“It is time again to ask whether 
the executive is ‘unitary’ in the sense that the President must have plenary power to control 
administration and execution of the laws.”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the 
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1995) (“From the recent evidence, it seems clear 
that presidential oversight of the regulatory process, though relatively new, has become a permanent 
part of the institutional design of American government.”). 
43. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 568–70 (1994) (“The important point here is that once history’s grab 
bag of assorted enumerated powers is run through the Constitution’s trinitarian ‘funnel,’ the 
President must end up with any administrative powers that otherwise cannot be accounted for.”). 
44. See generally Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249 (“Where once presidential supervision had 
worked to dilute or delay regulatory initiatives, it served in the Clinton years as part of a distinctly 
activist and pro-regulatory governing agenda.”). 
45. Id. at 2364. 
46. E.g., id. at 2334 (noting that the president is the only official “elected by a national 
constituency in votes focused on general, rather than local, policy issues”). 
47. E.g., id. at 2335 (“[B]ecause the President has a national constituency, he is likely to 
consider . . . the preferences of the general public . . . .”); id. at 2384 (“Presidential administration 
. . . advances political accountability by subjecting the bureaucracy to the control mechanism most 
open to public examination and most responsive to public opinion.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 
(1985) (arguing that presidential control increases “the responsiveness of government to the desires 
of the electorate”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential 
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193–96 (1994) (arguing that 
the president is politically accountable to a broader, less organized constituency, which helps him 
withstand the pressures that interest groups exert on members of Congress); infra subpart V(A) 
(considering the accountability argument). 
48. Farina, supra note 41, at 182; see, e.g., Bressman, supra note 41, at 494 (“[M]ajoritarianism 
fails to account for a concern of paramount importance in the administrative state—namely, the 
concern for arbitrary administrative decisionmaking.”); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in 
the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate 
Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 830–32 (1996) (“Critics of presidential power . . . emphasize 
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developments in national politics and administrative practice were underway 
that soon yielded more aggressive exercises and defenses of presidential 
administration. 
B. Politicization and Polarization 
The seeds of a stronger presidential administration were present in 
Kagan’s account. She noted that the reemergence of divided government 
made legislating difficult, so President Clinton turned to the bureaucracy to 
advance his domestic policy agenda.49 Since she wrote, political polarization 
has increased, and presidential administration has become a matter not only 
of shaping agencies’ exercise of congressionally conferred power but also of 
making policy without Congress. As the practice has expanded, so too have 
commentators defended more sweeping presidential policymaking. 
As an initial matter, partisan polarization has made it easier for 
presidents to advance policy ends through agency action. The presidential 
administration of the Reagan and Clinton years was largely defined by 
attempts to control regulation from the White House, and often the person of 
the president himself.50 Alongside regulatory review, directives, and other 
centralizing strategies, however, a more powerful tool of presidential 
administration was emerging: politicization of the bureaucracy.51 The 
number of political appointees in agencies multiplied, and presidents 
assumed the role of Congress and local party organizations in filling these 
 
the failures of recent presidents: their lack of accountability to many important political 
constituencies (both majoritarian and minoritarian); their inability to exercise effective leadership; 
and their apparent lack of competence, let alone expertise.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential 
Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 444 (1987) (“[T]he 
President ought to play a more limited role in regulatory agency decisionmaking than some of the 
recent regulatory reform proposals suggest.”); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System 
of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 
212–14 (1995) (“[C]onstitutional theorists who prize bureaucratic accountability should abhor any 
reading of the Constitution that mandates a single structural route towards its realization.”); Sidney 
A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 
21 (1994) (“[I]ndividual voters ordinarily do not have a sufficient interest in regulatory issues to 
justify monitoring governmental decisionmaking, let alone to attempt to influence it. If voters lack 
an incentive to observe the behavior of their agents, elected officials have no incentive to conform 
to the voters’ policy preferences.”). 
49. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2248, 2250, 2311. 
50. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
51. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 2 (2008) (“People 
commonly refer to the act of increasing the number and penetration of appointees as ‘politicization.’ 
Politicized agencies, then, are those that have the largest percentage and deepest penetration of 
appointees.”); David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age 
of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1129 (2008) (describing a shift from 
centralization strategies to politicization strategies since the 1980s); Moe, supra note 35, at 235–36, 
244–45 (discussing politicization versus centralization); Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, 
Presidents and the Politics of Structure, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 18 (describing 
politicization in terms of presidential appointment of “loyal, ideologically compatible people in 
pivotal positions”). 
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positions.52 With political appointees inside agencies, presidents would have 
less need to superintend agency exercises of discretionary power through 
centralization: agency officials would choose to align their policymaking 
with presidential prerogatives in the first instance.53 
While the number of political appointees grew throughout the latter half 
of the twentieth century,54 the recent increase in political polarization has 
made politicization-through-appointment a more manageable strategy. As 
the parties have grown more nationally and presidentially oriented, as they 
have grown more coherent and programmatic, and as they have grown more 
distinct from one another, partisan labels signal views on a host of domestic 
policy issues, and presidents can rely on these labels to populate agencies 
well below the department-head level.55 The local party organization may 
have disappeared as a player in appointments, but national partisan networks 
have taken over.56 This enables presidents to appoint a thick layer of 
politically aligned agency officials, even when party organizations 
themselves are weak. 
At the same time as Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have continued 
long-standing practices of centralization and adopted some new ones,57 then, 
 
52. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 3 (documenting “a dramatic expansion in the number of 
political appointments”); Barron, supra note 51, at 1122–32 (describing the declining influence of 
Congress and the political parties over appointments). 
53. See Moe, supra note 35, at 245 (describing how presidents can make appointments “on the 
basis of loyalty, ideology, or programmatic support”); see also Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. 
Gersen, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 YALE L.J. 1002, 1031 (2017) (studying federal 
spending to show that the extent of high-level personnel politicization affects agencies’ political 
responsiveness); George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Experiential Learning and 
Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency 
Leadership Appointments, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 914, 926–28 (2016) (showing that presidents 
increasingly favor loyalty over competence in making appointments over the course of their tenure). 
54. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 3; Barron, supra note 51, at 1122–28. 
55. See Michael A. Livermore, Political Parties and Presidential Oversight, 67 ALA. L. REV. 
45, 62–80 (2015) (detailing how increasingly programmatic, nationally focused, and distinctive 
political parties enable presidents to predict the behavior of potential appointees based on party 
affiliation); see also Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party 
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 491–96 (2008) (describing 
how party polarization enables presidents to effectively control independent agencies by appointing 
a majority of commissioners). 
56. See generally DAVID KAROL, PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (2009) 
(describing parties as “coalitions of groups with intense preferences on particular issues managed 
by politicians”); SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND 41 (2009) (suggesting “a theory of parties 
that accounts for the coordination of various actors both inside and outside the government”); 
Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in 
American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 571 (2012) (arguing that parties are “best understood as 
coalitions of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular 
goals”). 
57. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White 
House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2583–86 (2011) (describing President Obama’s use of 
“czars”); Watts, supra note 18, at 693–706 (exploring President Bush’s and President Obama’s 
efforts to control administrative action); see also infra notes 188–94 (providing a catalog of 
recognized techniques of presidential administration). 
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they have also influenced the administrative state considerably through 
appointments. The Clean Power Plan, DAPA and DACA, net neutrality—
these and their respective repeals are as much agency officials’ policy as the 
president’s. The president’s directives and review of agency decisions have 
been less significant than his selection of agency appointees in the first 
instance. 
As these examples further underscore, the political polarization that has 
made it easier for presidents to “remake agencies in their own image”58 has 
also underwritten bolder exercises of presidential policymaking. Especially 
under conditions of divided government, Congress struggles to legislate. 
With the public looking to them, presidents in turn rely on agency action.59 
In President Obama’s phrase, “We Can’t Wait”: if Congress would not 
address climate change, immigration, internet regulation, and other important 
questions, the administration would act.60 When the Clean Power Plan, 
DAPA and DACA, and net neutrality arrived in court, the main legal question 
was whether statutory delegations could encompass these administrative 
policies. The issue was not presidential direction of the EPA, DHS, and FCC, 
but rather whether the Clean Air Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
and the Communications Act authorized these agencies to adopt such 
policies.61 
Even as litigation has focused on the connection between statutes and 
administrative policy, commentators have defended a presidential 
administration that is not bounded by congressional authorization but is 
instead autonomous in its authority. Kagan’s account of presidential 
administration depicted a powerful executive, but she took care to link 
presidential administration to congressional decisions. “Administrative 
action is unlikely to provide a president with all he could obtain through 
legislation,” she wrote. “Congress, after all, has set bounds on administration 
through prior statutory enactments.”62 In the last decade, scholars have 
 
58. Barron, supra note 51, at 1096. 
59. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s 
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 
410–12 (2009); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 
92 TEXAS L. REV. 1137, 1155–57 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the 
States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1752–57 (2015); see also Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, 
Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms About Executive Power, 164 
U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1870–73 (2016) (studying how the public perceives presidential direction of 
agency action). 
60. E.g., Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama, Partisan 
Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 FORUM 3, 6–8, 10–12, 14–15 (2014). 
61. See supra note 5. 
62. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2312. Kagan was skeptical of the current Congress, arguing that 
the “Congress” at work overseeing exercises of administrative discretion was in fact “members of 
congressional committees and subcommittees almost guaranteed by their composition and 
associated incentive structure to be unrepresentative of national interests.” Id. at 2336. And she 
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suggested that these prior statutory enactments may not impose substantial 
limits on presidential policymaking.63 
Most dramatically, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue 
that executive power is largely unconstrained by law.64 Treating the president 
and agencies as continuous,65 they posit that “[l]ong-term economic and 
institutional forces—most generally . . . the rapidity of change in the 
policymaking environment and the institutional incapacity of legislatures and 
courts to supply the necessary policy adjustments—make executive 
governance inevitable.”66 Instead of indulging “tyrannophobia”67 or trying to 
resurrect Madisonian separation of powers, Posner and Vermeule suggest we 
should recognize politics as the only plausible check and focus on “making 
executive government more credible and more responsive to public 
opinion.”68 
Other scholars have offered more modest accounts of the legally 
unconstrained executive. Some depict the executive branch as an independent 
policymaker that need not—or cannot—be bound by congressional will in 
particular areas. For example, Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez 
argue that the president should not be constrained by congressional 
immigration-enforcement priorities, which are largely a chimera.69 They 
propose instead a “two-principals” model of immigration policymaking.70 
Against charges of lawlessness, they respond not only that presidential 
policymaking is inevitable and disciplined by politics but also that procedural 
regularity and transparency are the relevant legal constraints.71 Other scholars 
 
recognized that presidents might “push the envelope when interpreting statutes.” Id. at 2349. But 
she advocated judicial review of agency action as the answer to the threat of presidential lawlessness 
and never questioned that Congress was the author of the whole arrangement. Id. at 2372–73. 
63. See generally Farber & O’Connell, supra note 59, at 1155, 1183 (arguing, against the 
assumption “that the source of authority of agency action is statutory,” that “[i]n the real world of 
administrative law, the White House is the main player”); Merrill, supra note 18, at 1958–59 (noting 
that administrative governance is outrunning statutory authorization and that scholars are 
increasingly justifying administrative action with respect to transparency and other process values 
rather than legal authorization). 
64. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 15 (2010) (“[L]aw 
does little to constrain the modern executive.”); id. at 112 (“[T]he basic aspiration of liberal legalism 
to constrain the executive through statutory law has largely failed.”). But see Richard H. Pildes, Law 
and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1403, 1408–09 (2012) (reviewing POSNER & 
VERMEULE, supra) (arguing that Posner and Vermeule do not provide empirical evidence for this 
claim and in fact furnish a theoretical explanation for why self-interested presidents would accept 
law as a constraint). 
65. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 5–6 (defining the “executive” and noting 
substantial presidential influence over both executive and independent agencies). 
66. Id. at 16. 
67. Id. at 177. 
68. Id. at 16. 
69. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104, 109–10 (2015). 
70. Id. at 110. 
71. See id. at 111, 135–36, 175, 210–12. 
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call for the president to displace Congress as the nation’s principal lawmaker; 
Professors William Howell and Terry Moe advocate making “Congress less 
central to the legislative process and presidents more central.”72 
In different ways, these and other accounts both describe and defend an 
expansive, autonomous variant of presidential administration.73 Unlike early 
accounts that focused on the president’s relationship to agencies, more recent 
accounts assume substantial identity between the president and both 
executive and independent agencies and inquire into the power of the 
executive branch more generally. 
II. The Current Predicament 
Today, presidential administration is entrenched and expansive. 
Significant policy decisions of the Obama and Trump Administrations have 
been advanced through agency action rather than legislation. But presidential 
administration may also be weaker than ever. Most apparently, muscular 
presidential administration can be quite fragile over time, as a new 
administration has both the incentive and the ability to revise its 
predecessor’s policies.74 President Obama’s most significant regulatory 
achievements have been repealed or are in the process of being repealed by 
the Trump Administration. The Clean Power Plan, DACA and DAPA, and 
federal net-neutrality rules were all early targets of presidential directives and 
agency action.75 So too were the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule;76 
environmental rules regulating fracking, limiting methane leaks, and banning 
drilling for oil in the Arctic; education rules furnishing protections for 
transgender students and regulating campus sexual assaults; and numerous 
other policies.77 For skeptics of presidential control, these reversals bolster 
longstanding criticisms grounded in expertise, reasoned decisionmaking, and 
 
72. WILLIAM G. HOWELL & TERRY M. MOE, RELIC: HOW OUR CONSTITUTION UNDERMINES 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT—AND WHY WE NEED A MORE POWERFUL PRESIDENCY xv–xvi (2016) 
(arguing that whereas Congress is parochial, the president is a national leader, concerned for her 
legacy, and invested in a coherent approach to all of government, and thus a superior lawmaker). 
73. See generally Merrill, supra note 18 (canvassing accounts that replace positive law with 
process norms). 
74. See Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10, at 607 (“The President’s ability to control 
administration has become sufficiently powerful that erasing a prior Administration requires little 
more than determination—and perhaps a dash of ruthlessness.”). 
75. See supra note 6. 
76. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510 & 2550). 
77. See supra notes 7–9; Philip Bump, What Trump Has Undone, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/08/24/what-trump-has-undone/?utm
_term=.e844d065f1d6 [https://perma.cc/M8TB-ZCCK] (compiling Trump reversals of Obama 
regulatory policies during his first year in office). See generally Noll & Revesz, supra note 21 
(documenting Trump’s rollbacks of Obama-era regulations). 
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pluralism, but proponents of presidential administration also have reason to 
worry about such regulatory whiplash.78 
If political transitions illustrate the inability of presidential 
administration to sustain policies over time, a different set of problems 
appears in doctrine and scholarship. The Supreme Court increasingly 
embraces presidential control over agencies, but it is setting the “president” 
and “administration” at odds with one another, requiring greater presidential 
control over agencies while also limiting the reach of agency policymaking. 
Scholars who defend administration, in turn, respond to an overweening 
president by conflating bureaucratic and representative forms of legitimacy, 
threatening to undermine the force of both. 
A. Doctrine: Pro-President as Anti-Administration 
As the scope of presidential administration has expanded, the Supreme 
Court has developed an ambivalent doctrine: empowering the president vis-
à-vis the bureaucracy but also seeking to limit the administrative domain over 
which she presides. To the extent presidential administration’s clearest 
forbearer was the unitary-executive theory, there was always some irony to 
its serving as a legitimating theory of administration. But in the 1980s and 
1990s, “the new formalism [did] not emphasize the nondelegation doctrine 
and the dismantling of the regulatory state” even as it stressed Article II 
power.79 Leveraging presidential power to undermine administrative 
governance is a more recent development. 
Over the past decade, the Court has cast presidential control over 
agencies as both a constitutional edict and a demand of popular sovereignty. 
For example, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Board,80 the Court invalidated “double for-cause” removal protections as 
infringing Article II’s vesting of executive power in the president.81 
Describing why the formal problem was also a threat to political 
accountability, the Court equated presidential administration with popular 
control over the bureaucracy: 
Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern 
themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive 
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect 
of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the 
 
78. See infra subpart V(A) (considering the accountability defense of presidential 
administration). 
79. Farina, supra note 41, at 181. 
80. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
81. Id. at 488, 495–99. The insulation was “double” because PCAOB members were appointed 
by SEC Commissioners, who were themselves understood to enjoy for-cause removal protection. 
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Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.82 
In Lucia v. SEC,83 the Court more modestly determined that administrative 
law judges working for the SEC are inferior officers.84 It did not take up the 
Solicitor General’s request that it deem for-cause removal protections for 
such ALJs unconstitutional, but that question will likely return to a Court 
whose newest member appears to be a committed unitary executivist.85 
Recent decisions have also embraced politicized, presidentially directed 
agency action. Reviewing the Secretary of Commerce’s decision to include 
a citizenship question on the Census, the Court stated, “[A] court may not set 
aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because it might have been 
influenced by political considerations or prompted by an Administration’s 
priorities. Agency policymaking is not a ‘rarified technocratic process, 
unaffected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential 
power.’”86 Reviewing politicized agency decisions during the George W. 
Bush Administration, the Court had invalidated executive positions it “found 
untrustworthy, in the sense that executive expertise had been subordinated to 
politics.”87 But in the Census case, the Court cast “political considerations” 
and “Presidential power” as not only permissible, but legitimating. Even as 
it held that the Secretary of Commerce’s furnished explanation was 
pretextual, it opened the door to a more overtly political justification and 
favorably distinguished “the Secretary’s policymaking discretion” from “the 
Bureau’s technocratic expertise.”88 
As its distinction between the “technocratic” and the political suggests, 
at the same time as the Court has embraced presidential control, it has 
 
82. Id. at 499; see also, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (“[A]gencies . . . 
have political accountability, because they are subject to the supervision of the President, who in 
turn answers to the public.”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313–14 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that “the Constitution empowers the President to keep federal officers 
accountable,” but expressing concern that the President cannot sufficiently superintend agency 
action in practice). 
83. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
84. Id. at 2049. 
85. See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 164, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Under Article II, an independent agency that exercises substantial 
executive power may not be headed by a single Director. . . . [That Director must be] supervised, 
directed, and removable at will by the President.”). 
86. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (quoting Sierra Club v. 
Costle, 657 F.3d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
87. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (“EPA has offered no 
reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to 
climate change. Its action was therefore ‘arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.’”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257–58 (2006) (holding that the Controlled 
Substances Act did not authorize the Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing drugs 
for use in physician-assisted suicide, and noting that the agency had not used “its expertise and 
experience to formulate a regulation”). 
88. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2571 (“[T]he Census Act authorizes the Secretary, not the 
Bureau, to make policy choices within the range of reasonable options.”). 
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expressed skepticism about the scope of administration.89 Presidential 
superintendence may be necessary to administration’s constitutional and 
political legitimacy, on this view, but it is not sufficient to justify the current 
reach of the administrative state. A number of Justices have questioned the 
doctrinal building blocks of administrative power, from a generous 
nondelegation test to judicial deference. In its most recent term, the Court 
imposed a new “step zero” for Auer deference and could not garner a majority 
to defend such deference.90 It likewise found only four votes in support of the 
longstanding “intelligible principle” approach to the nondelegation 
doctrine.91 More significant than any express limitations are subtler ways in 
 
89. See John Harrison, The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power, 126 YALE 
L.J. F. 374, 375 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Harrisonforwebsite_7vou5ojq.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NDF-3REQ] (noting Justice Alito’s distinction between the scope of executive 
power and who within the executive branch controls such power); Metzger, supra note 20, at 37 
(distinguishing the concern that executive power is politically unaccountable from the concern that 
executive power is aggrandized). 
90. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–18 (2019) (noting that Auer deference “often 
doesn’t” apply because it applies only when a regulation is genuinely ambiguous, the interpretation 
is reasonable, and the interpretation is the agency’s official position that implicates its substantive 
expertise and reflects its fair and considered judgment); see id. at 2424–25 (Roberts, J., concurring 
in part) (joining only the parts of the opinion that did not defend the merits of Auer deference); id. 
at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “it should have been easy for the 
Court to say goodbye to Auer v. Robbins,” calling on lower courts to “take courage from today’s 
ruling and realize that it has transformed Auer into a paper tiger,” and noting that “this case hardly 
promises to be this Court’s last word on Auer”); cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (describing Chevron step zero). In other cases, 
several Justices have more generally expressed reservations about administrative discretion. See, 
e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“These cases bring 
into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to 
countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 
1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing concern about 
“aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 
1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate 
federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the 
framers’ design.”); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[W]ith hundreds of federal agencies poking into every nook and cranny of daily life, 
[citizens might] understandably question whether Presidential oversight—a critical part of the 
constitutional plan—is always an effective safeguard against agency overreaching.”). 
91. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that he would “support th[e] effort” to “reconsider the approach” to delegation 
the Court has “taken for the past 84 years”); see id. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing for a 
substantially narrower delegation test and stating that “[t]o leave this aspect of the constitutional 
structure alone undefended would serve only to accelerate the flight of power from the legislative 
to the executive branch, turning the latter into a vortex of authority that was constitutionally reserved 
for the people’s representatives in order to protect their liberties”); see id. at 2130 (plurality opinion) 
(“[I]f SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—
dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its 
programs.”). The Gundy dissenters did not appear to have similar reservations about an open-ended 
delegation to the Secretary of Commerce to make decisions about the Census. Dep’t of Commerce, 
139 S. Ct. at 2576 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although not likely the 
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which the Court is pruning deference. Even while applying Chevron, it has 
read statutes aggressively to reject agency interpretations, including at step 
two,92 and it has applied the major-question exception in a manner that 
destabilizes the very premise of deference.93 Recently, Justice Gorsuch 
frankly described the Court’s deployment of this doctrine as an effort to “rein 
in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power” by a “different name[].”94 
Although it remains to be seen whether the Court will meaningfully alter 
the scope of the administrative state,95 at a minimum, its decisions endorse a 
shift of power to the president and political appointees from other agency 
employees and fire warning shots about the fate of future “pro-regulatory”96 
administrative policymaking. In response to these warning shots, 
commentators have assailed the Court’s reductionist equation of the president 
and the people and its unspoken assumptions about where administrative 
power would flow if removed from agencies. The approach suggested in 
recent opinions requires either implausible assumptions about congressional 
capacity or else willingness to endorse rule-by-judiciary in the service of 
 
rationale, the comfort with this broad delegation is consistent with then-Professor Kagan’s 
argument, contra extant nondelegation doctrine, for greater acceptance of delegated power when 
agency actions are “clothed with the imprimatur and authority of the President.” Kagan, supra note 
17, at 2369. 
92. See, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706–07 (rejecting an agency interpretation as 
unreasonable at step two of Chevron). 
93. The notion that a question’s deep “political significance” means it cannot be entrusted to an 
agency and must instead fall to the judiciary is in considerable tension with Chevron’s suggestion 
that such questions are better left to agencies than constituency-less judges. Yet in recent cases, the 
Court has expanded the major-question exception “from a caution against reading broad powers 
into narrow language into a general presumption that important questions are simply inappropriate 
for agency resolution.” Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the 
Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2033 (2018); 
see, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (“Whether those credits are available 
on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central 
to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would 
have done so expressly.” (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))); 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444–45 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak 
clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” 
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000))). 
94. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see id. at 2142 (“Although it is 
nominally a canon of statutory construction, we apply the major questions doctrine in service of the 
constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that 
power to an executive agency.”). 
95. For different predictions, compare, for example, Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending 
Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1651 (2018) (“Two things seem 
clear: attacks on the administrative state are likely to continue and are likely to be unsuccessful.”), 
and Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative 
State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2017) (“[O]utside of a largely elite discourse of ‘classical 
liberals,’ libertarians, and nostalgists for an imagined common law past, the administrative state has 
never been more secure.”), with Metzger, supra note 20, at 17–33, 47–51 (cataloging judicial and 
academic challenges to the contemporary administrative state and suggesting that the attack is a 
genuine threat). 
96. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249. 
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resolving a democratic deficit. Despite a compelling diagnosis of this “anti-
administrative”97 turn, however, leading responses have themselves been 
warped by the extent of presidential control over administration. 
B. Scholarship: Bureaucracy as the Separation of Powers 
Confronting persistent attacks on the administrative state,98 scholars 
have long sketched two complementary accounts of its legitimacy. Put 
simply, “external” accounts emphasize agencies’ connections to the three 
named branches of government, focusing on constitutional structure, politics, 
and elections, while “internal” accounts emphasize autonomous values of 
agency decisionmaking, such as expertise, deliberation, and reason-giving.99 
Both an external and an internal perspective are necessary to defend the 
administrative state. Neither suffices on its own. But if recent “anti-
administrative” attacks tend to neglect expertise, deliberation, and reason-
giving, recent “pro-administrative” defenses themselves tend to neglect 
external political engagement. The reason is not hard to see. Twentieth-
century accounts emphasized ways in which the three named branches 
participated in guiding and overseeing agency action.100 In Professor Peter 
 
97. Metzger, supra note 20, at 3. 
98. See generally JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 10 (1978) (arguing that “a strong and persisting challenge 
to the basic legitimacy of the administrative process” recurs generation after generation); Beermann, 
supra note 95, at 1599 (“[T]he assault on the administrative state is never ending.”); Cynthia R. 
Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 987, 987 (1997) (“Like an intriguing but awkward family heirloom, the legitimacy problem is 
handed down from generation to generation of administrative law scholars.”); Jeremy K. Kessler, 
The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 719 (2016) (reviewing 
DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN 
AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014)) (“[H]owever ‘normal’ the administrative state may (in truth) be, the 
American people’s ‘uneasiness’ about its legitimacy persists. The recent proliferation of scholarly 
defenses of the historical pedigree of the administrative state is a testament to the distinctively 
historical cast of our present generation’s ‘uneasiness.’” (quoting FREEDMAN, supra, at 9, 11)). 
99. Although external accounts may claim the mantle of democracy, it is more precise to 
associate such accounts with representative democracy given the frequent reliance of internal 
accounts on deliberative democracy. See MASHAW, supra note 29, at 157–58 (noting “two rather 
distinct grounds for the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking – agencies’ accountability to 
political controllers and agencies’ capacity to exercise statutorily delegated power on the basis of 
knowledge” and arguing that the distinction is not between politics and expertise so much as 
between electoral and deliberative forms of democracy). That said, the deliberative-democracy 
premise of justification or acceptability may “exclude certain persons from concern or . . . treat them 
as hypothetical persons who would reason differently than they actually do,” id. at 169—a move 
that collapses much of the space between deliberative democracy and expertise. 
100. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984) (“The theory of separation-of-powers breaks 
down when attempting to locate administrative and regulatory agencies within one of the three 
branches; its vitality, rather, lies in the formulation and specification of the controls that Congress, 
the Supreme Court and the President may exercise over administration and regulation.”). See 
generally Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, 
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Strauss’s formulation, for example, Congress, the president, and the courts 
all “share[d] the reins of control” over agencies, so the separation of powers 
in the administrative state was the constitutional separation of powers acting 
upon the administrative state.101 But recent scholarship has all but given up 
on Congress. In a concession to presidential administration as a descriptive 
reality, this scholarship begins from the premise of a dominant president. It 
then seeks to counterbalance presidential power with bureaucratic 
mechanisms, not other representative institutions. 
Recognizing that the White House has largely displaced other political 
controls over administration, scholars have begun to cast expertise, 
deliberation, and reason-giving as responses to presidential power as such. 
The internal turn purports to do the work of external controls, but as scholars 
effectively replace Congress with administrative actors, they give up too 
easily on political representation beyond the president herself. 
In her recent response to “the administrative state under siege,” for 
example, Professor Gillian Metzger argues that bureaucracy is not only 
consistent with but in fact necessary to realizing the separation of powers in 
the twenty-first century.102 Because presidential administration is the “central 
reality of the contemporary national government” and broad delegations from 
Congress are inevitable, the constitutional imperative is to reduce the “risk 
of executive branch unilateralism and aggrandizement.”103 Enter 
bureaucracy: Metzger proposes that “the internal complexity of the 
administrative state—the way it marries together presidential control, 
bureaucratic oversight, expertise, professionalism, structural insulation, 
procedural requirements, and the like— . . . holds the key to securing 
accountable, constrained, and effective exercise of executive power.”104 
Reviving a strand of James Landis’s defense of administrative process,105 
 
and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1345 (2004) 
(describing the American “postwar constitutional settlement” as accepting “the concentration of 
power in the executive and administrative spheres . . . on the condition that, at the subconstitutional 
level, delegated authority would be subject to a range of political and legal controls that would act 
as a substitute for the formal structural protections of separation of powers”). 
101. Strauss, supra note 100, at 580. 
102. Metzger, supra note 20, at 78. 
103. Id. at 75. 
104. Id. at 78; see also Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1263–65 (2017) (describing limits of external constraints and advocating 
internal constraints on agency action). 
105.  Landis argued: 
 The administrative process is, in essence, our generation’s answer to the 
inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes. It represents our effort to 
find an answer to those inadequacies by some other method than merely increasing 
executive power. If the doctrine of the separation of power implies division, it also 
implies balance, and balance calls for equality. The creation of administrative 
power may be the means for the preservation of that balance, so that paradoxically 
enough, though it may seem in theoretic violation of the doctrine of the separation 
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Metzger argues that bureaucratic actors and procedure are constitutionally 
obligatory means of realizing separation of powers commitments in an age 
of presidential administration.106 
Professor Jon Michaels makes a more literal internal separation of 
powers argument. If Metzger suggests that certain commitments of the 
constitutional design may be realized within the administrative realm, 
Michaels assigns the roles and functions of each branch to particular 
administrative units: agency leaders represent the president; the civil service 
represents the judiciary; and civil society represents Congress.107 The 
“constitutional revivalism” he propounds likewise reasons from the reality of 
a strong president in need of checks and balances Congress cannot supply: 
“[T]he administrative separation of powers ensures that when the president 
channels legislative-like responsibilities into the administrative domain, 
inclusive, rivalrous, and heterogeneous governance perdures—and checks 
and balances are preserved notwithstanding the apparent circumvention of 
the constitutional separation of powers.”108 
 
of power, it may in matter of fact be the means for the preservation of the content 
of that doctrine. 
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938). 
106. Metzger, supra note 20, at 87–91; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of 
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316–17 
(2006) (“If major decisions are going to be made by the President, then how might separation of 
powers be reflected within the executive branch? . . . A critical mechanism to promote internal 
separation of powers is bureaucracy.”). 
107. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP 8–9 (2017) (“[W]ithin the administrative 
arena, agency leaders stood in for the president . . . ; the tenured, expert civil service acted the part 
of our independent and largely apolitical federal judiciary . . . ; and the public writ large (what I call 
civil society) re-created Congress’s populist, pluralistic, and cacophonic deliberative role . . . .”); 
see id. at 59–77 (elaborating this tripartite framework). 
108. Id. at 150. These are not the first accounts to hybridize external and internal forms of 
legitimacy. For example, the civic republicanism of the 1990s reimagined agency deliberation as a 
broadly participatory process. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the 
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515, 1560 (1992) (arguing that “having 
administrative agencies set government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic 
republicanism’s call for deliberative decisionmaking informed by the values of the entire polity” 
and that “the paradigmatic process for agency formulation of policy—informal rulemaking—is 
specifically geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory”); Note, Civic Republican 
Administrative Theory: Bureaucrats as Deliberative Democrats, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1417 
(1994) (“[C]ivic republican administrative theorists imaginatively reconstruct the evidence to find 
republicanism alive and well in the informal rulemaking, administrative hearings, and staff 
discussions that the national bureaucracy oversees daily. Rhetorically, civic republicanism attempts 
to connect this reconstruction to a normatively attractive vision of highly participatory and 
deliberative politics.”); cf. Jerry Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 559, 580 
(1990) (suggesting that public boards of directors, citizen groups chosen by lot, and ad hoc task 
forces might be integrated into federal administration). A version of this argument appears today in 
celebrations of notice-and-comment rulemaking, in particular as an externally facing form of agency 
deliberative democracy, with the public at large speaking for itself rather than through representative 
institutions. See generally Emerson, supra note 93, at 2081 (arguing that presidential direction of 
the administrative state must be accompanied by participation by “the public at large” to “ensure its 
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The internal-as-external account reflects the form of recent attacks on 
the administrative state.109 It is a defense that responds to separation-of-
powers arguments by mirroring their structure. But merging the internal and 
external in this manner risks undermining the force of each. Not only do 
expertise, professionalism, and procedure appear nonresponsive to formal 
constitutional arguments; they also sell short the particular logic of 
administrative decisionmaking and the ways in which these values are 
distinct from “electorally based representative government.”110 More 
pertinent here, the internal turn paradoxically reinforces presidential power. 
Expertise, procedure, and professional judgment may well tame presidential 
power—indeed, they may complement it with more deliberative forms of 
engagement—but they do not connect administration to representative 
democracy.111 By abandoning other connections between agencies and 
representative institutions, recent internal accounts leave the president as the 
sole political representative authoring administrative policy. 
III. Lost Roots 
If we are living more than ever in an age of presidential administration, 
so too do practice, doctrine, and theory alike reveal presidential control to be 
an inadequate foundation for today’s administrative state. Courts may 
embrace presidential control over agency actions only to hold that agencies 
themselves cannot act, for example, or one president may rely on agencies to 
set domestic policy only to see her decisions erased by her successor. 
To more fully understand both the force and the limits of presidential 
administration, we need to look beyond Washington. Once we bring the 
states into view, presidential administration appears still more potent in key 
respects: working together with the states, presidents have long realized 
policy outcomes they could not achieve through federal agency action alone, 
 
democratic legitimacy”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 519, 568 (2015) (“[P]ublic input into one of the most important forms of agency decision-
making—notice-and-comment rulemaking—is derived from a process that is more deliberative than 
majoritarian or special interest captured.”). 
109. E.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 13 (2014); see also 
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). 
110. Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 459 (2003). See generally Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: 
Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 469–70 (2012) (arguing 
that a “deliberative-constitutive paradigm” of administrative legitimacy focuses on expertise, 
deliberation, and reason-giving as forms of “inside-out accountability”). 
111. See, e.g., Rahman, supra note 10, at 1704 (“We cannot expect the administrative process 
to by itself do all the moral and political work of catalyzing, sustaining, channeling, and ultimately 
legitimizing political contestation and policy outcomes. At some point, we have to look to our 
broader democratic ecosystem . . . .”); Stewart, supra note 110, at 459 (describing the disconnect 
between administration and electorally based representative government); cf. Kagan, supra note 17, 
at 2353 (“[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor special competence to make the 
value judgments—the essentially political choices—that underlie most administrative 
policymaking.”). 
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and such policies outlive their administrations. But states also introduce new 
connections between administration and representative democracy: when the 
president establishes policy in conjunction with state governments, she is no 
longer the only elected official in the administrative domain. 
Although twenty-first century political polarization brings new urgency 
to the state role, as the next Part explores, intergovernmental presidential 
administration is longstanding. Scholars typically trace presidential 
administration to the work of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
Brownlow Committee, which “established the infrastructure underlying all 
subsequent attempts by the White House to supervise administrative 
policy.”112 A number of the Committee’s arguments are familiar touchstones, 
particularly its suggestion that presidential control was a response to the 
“headless ‘fourth branch’”113 and its insistence that a powerful executive was 
essential to, rather than a threat to, democratic government.114 
Complementing these arguments was a set of claims grounded in 
territory: the Committee relied on federalism, localism, and regionalism to 
make its case for presidential control over administration. First, consistent 
with then-emerging premises of cooperative federalism, the Brownlow 
Committee recognized that even a robust federal administration would lack 
power to effectuate domestic policy on its own; it would have to collaborate 
with the states to achieve certain ends. Administration would necessarily be 
intergovernmental. Second, it proposed that the need to coordinate the work 
of federal agencies both with one another and with state and local 
administration required a stronger president. Administration would 
necessarily be presidential. Finally, the Committee suggested that 
geographical decentralization could furnish representative government 
within the broad domain of the executive branch. Intergovernmental 
presidential administration meant that the concentration of federal power in 
the executive need not amount to “overcentralization.”115 
 
112. E.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2275; see also, e.g., Sidney M. Milkis, Executive Power and 
Political Parties: The Dilemmas of Scale in American Democracy, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
379, 392 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark A. Peterson eds., 2005) (labeling the resulting 1939 
Reorganization Act the “organic statute of the ‘modern presidency’”); Peri E. Arnold, The 
Brownlow Committee, Regulation, and the Presidency: Seventy Years Later, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
1030, 1035 (2007) (“Seventy years after Roosevelt submitted the Brownlow Committee’s final 
report to Congress, the new administrative order that the committee championed is ascendant, and 
the committee’s goals for regulation have been achieved in principle.”). 
113. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 36. 
114. Id. at 47 (“[T]he really imminent danger now is that our democracy . . . may be led by false 
or mistaken guides to place their trust in weak and faltering inaction . . . . Strong executive 
leadership is essential to democratic government today.”). 
115. Id. at 26. 
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A. The Brownlow Committee 
To appreciate the Brownlow Committee’s territorial arguments requires 
a brief note on the backstory of its work. President Roosevelt convened the 
Committee to offer a plan with respect to “administrative management—the 
organization for the performance of the duties imposed upon the President in 
exercising the executive power vested in him by the Constitution of the 
United States,”116 a task he understood to be of constitutional moment.117 
Before creating the Brownlow Committee, however, Roosevelt had planned 
to have the National Resources Committee (NRC)118 issue his executive 
 
116. Id. at 2. 
117. See SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES 109 (1993) (“Soon after the 
1936 election, FDR revealed that he viewed the Committee as a surrogate constitutional 
convention.”). As Luther Gulick recounted: 
[Roosevelt] said that since the election he had received a great many suggestions that 
he move for a constitutional convention for the United States and observed that there 
was no way of keeping such an affair from getting out of hand what with [Father] 
Coughlin and other crackpots about. “But,” he said, “there is more than one way of 
killing a cat, just as in the job I assigned you.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Luther Gulick’s notes from a November 1936 planning session 
with FDR and Brownlow). Ultimately, after an initial reorganization plan died in Congress in 1938, 
a less ambitious plan was adopted the following year. Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-
19, §§ 1–12, 53 Stat. 561, 561–64, superseded by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, §§ 901–
06, 80 Stat. 378, 394–96. Pursuant to this Act, President Roosevelt created the Executive Office of 
the President, and he moved an expanded Bureau of the Budget (later to become OMB) to this office 
from the Treasury Department. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, The President Presents Plan No. I to 
Carry Out the Provisions of the Reorganization Act. Apr. 25, 1939, in 8 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 245, 249 (1941); Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. §§ 576, 
577 (1938–1943). The reorganization also created the National Resources Planning Board, but this 
vehicle for territorial, democratic planning was killed off by Congress in 1943 (shortly after it issued 
a postwar plan that underwrote FDR’s proposed second Bill of Rights). Independent Offices 
Appropriations Act of 1944, ch. 145, 57 Stat. 169, 170 (1943). 
118. President Roosevelt created the National Resources Committee (first called the National 
Planning Board and the National Resources Board) to offer a plan for addressing “the physical, 
social, governmental, and economic aspects of public policies,” including questions of 
intergovernmental coordination. Exec. Order No. 6777 (1934). The order stated: 
The functions of the Board shall be to prepare and present to the President a 
program and plan of procedure dealing with the physical, social, governmental, 
and economic aspects of public policies . . . . The program and plan shall include 
the coordination of projects of Federal, State, and local governments . . . . 
Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 7065 (1935) (instructing the Committee to “consult and cooperate 
with agencies of the Federal Government, with the States and municipalities or agencies thereof” to 
make recommendations about the “planned development and use of land, water, and other national 
resources”).The first incarnation of the National Resources Committee was the National Planning 
Board, created by Harold Ickes pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act. In 1934, the 
National Planning Board was replaced by the National Resources Board to include members of the 
Cabinet, Exec. Order No. 6777 (1934), and in 1935, the National Resources Board became the 
National Resources Committee, Exec. Order No. 7065 (1935). Ultimately, pursuant to the 
Reorganization Act of 1939, FDR reconstituted the National Resources Committee as the National 
Resources Planning Board, which persisted until Congress terminated it in 1943. See Independent 
Offices Appropriations Act of 1944, ch. 145, 57 Stat. 169 (1943). 
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reorganization plan.119 Although he ultimately committed the project to a 
newly constituted group under his greater personal control, when Louis 
Brownlow and his colleagues took up the question of administrative 
management, they drew on the NRC’s work, especially its recently published 
study of Regional Factors in National Planning and Development.120 
Focusing on “important problems of planning and development which 
overlap State lines or which require the use of combined Federal and State 
powers,”121 Regional Factors responded to a burgeoning interstate 
cooperation movement,122 to the federal government’s regional approach to 
organizing federal agencies,123 and to concerns about sectional stress.124 
Unsurprisingly, then, Regional Factors offered an account of administration 
grounded in territory. The NRC treated both the vast area of the United States 
and the constraints of constitutional federalism as primary considerations for 
the rapidly developing administrative state. Although this territorial emphasis 
was significantly muted in the subsequent Brownlow Report, it informed the 
Committee’s understanding, as key passages reveal. 
1. Administration as Intergovernmental Administration.—Reading the 
Brownlow Report together with the NRC’s Regional Factors report 
underscores, first, that administration was understood to involve both federal 
and state activity—and that an ambitious president would need to collaborate 
 
119. Barry D. Karl, The Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, 
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 182–83. In the end, the NRC and Brownlow Committee shared a member, 
Charles Merriam, and Louis Brownlow had recommended Merriam, as well as Wesley Mitchell and 
Frederic Delano, to serve on a proposed national planning board after Merriam and Mitchell had 
completed their work on President Hoover’s Research Committee on Social Trends. Moreover, both 
committees drew on work by some of the same scholars, including James Fesler. 
120. NAT’L. RES. COMM., REGIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
(1935) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]; see Karl, supra note 119, at 183 (“[T]he Brownlow Committee 
proceeded to do its work, but building somewhat surreptitiously on a report issued by the planning 
board in 1935 . . . entitled Regional Factors in National Planning and Development.”). 
121. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at iii. 
122. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 729 (1925) (“The imaginative adaptation of 
the compact idea should add considerably to resources available to statesmen in the solution of 
problems presented by the growing interdependence, social and economic, of groups of States 
forming distinct regions.”). 
123. A survey concluded in February 1935 found, for example, that seventy-four federal 
agencies recognized the need for regional organization of administration, and because some used 
multiple regional organizations, 108 different federal regional schemes were being deployed. NRC 
REPORT, supra note 120, at 71; see also James W. Fesler, Federal Administrative Regions, 30 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 257, 259–60 (1936) (comparing federal regional schemes). 
124. See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, THE ATTACK ON LEVIATHAN: REGIONALISM AND 
NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (1938); HOWARD W. ODUM & HARRY ESTILL MOORE, 
AMERICAN REGIONALISM 16 (1938); FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
SECTIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1932). See generally Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, 
Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1895, 1922–28 (2018) (discussing federal regionalism 
in the 1920s–1940s); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 394–415 
(2018) (exploring how regionalism shaped the administrative state’s development). 
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with the states to achieve his objectives. Along with their contemporaries, 
members of the NRC and Brownlow Committee assumed that the 
constitutional division of powers between the states and the federal 
government limited what the latter could do on its own. But against a dual 
federalism that insisted on more thoroughgoing separation, they described 
the constitutional division of power as occasion for joint enterprise.125 
Although “Government in the United States is frequently presented as a 
conflict between the National Government and the States,” the NRC’s 
opening statement of principles maintained, “there are many functions for 
which coordinated action is required.”126 Solving public problems demanded 
“a sharing of powers” among federal and state authorities,127 as the many 
New Deal programs that relied on “Federal-State administration, and not . . . 
national administrative agencies alone” recognized.128 Even as the report 
urged a harmonious cooperative federalism, moreover, the authors described 
sectional tensions and posited state and regional differentiation of federal 
policy as a way to manage the nation’s internal divisions.129 Theirs was a 
political as well as managerial project. 
Although the Brownlow Committee was not similarly focused on 
federalism and regionalism, its members likewise recognized that numerous 
policy areas were reserved to the states and that cooperation was an 
administrative imperative. In proposing a permanent National Resources 
Board in the White House to “cooperate with departmental, State, and local 
agencies,” the Committee argued that intergovernmental cooperation was 
“one of the most valuable services rendered by a National Resources Board” 
and that it would require “diplomacy and intelligent interest rather than . . . 
legal authority and high command.”130 In its proposals to reorganize the 
federal executive branch, the Committee likewise stressed the need to 
 
125. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 183 (“Coordination of program-making . . . is 
required because the division of powers between Federal, State, and local governments under the 
Constitution of the United States, of the States, and the laws of both, prevents any one unit from 
dealing comprehensively with many problems.”). 
126. Id. at vii, 7 (endorsing “cooperation” of state and federal government in the “attack upon 
problems whose solution requires the exercise of constitutional powers distributed among them”). 
127. Id. at vii. See generally JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM (1938) 
(describing cooperative federalism); JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE NEW DEAL AND THE STATES 
(1969) (same). 
128. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 182–83. 
129. See, e.g., id. at ix (“The rapid and drastic changes occurring in our national life necessarily 
subject the Nation to heavy internal strains. . . . [A] series of interrelated regions, closely cooperating 
with the Federal establishment, would tend to cement the union and to promote the national solution 
of intersectional maladjustments.”); id. at ix, 8 (discussing Frederick Jackson Turner’s account of 
sectionalism); DAVIDSON, supra note 124, at 59 (noting that the NRC Report was “amazing” as a 
government publication because it took up “a systematic consideration of the taboo question of 
sectional stress and conflict”). 
130. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 25–26; see also id. at 27 (calling for the National 
Resources Board to be “provided with an annual appropriation, a considerable part of which should 
be used for aiding the several States in the maintenance of their State planning boards”). 
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improve the federal government’s “cooperat[ion] with State and local 
governments in the conduct of its affairs.”131 The Brownlow Committee not 
only recognized the necessity of intergovernmental coordination but also 
appreciated that federalism might bolster its account of presidential power. 
2. Intergovernmental Administration as Presidential Administration.—
Both the NRC and the Brownlow Committee cited the need for 
intergovernmental coordination as an important justification for greater 
presidential control over administration. In the NRC’s account: 
The very profusion of governmental agencies may prevent there being 
taken at any one point a total view of governmental policies relating 
to a given community, State, or group of States . . . . The responsibility 
of taking such a total view and formulating policies and objectives and 
priorities that must flow from it is that of the President.132  
Coordination problems that abounded in Washington alone were still more 
numerous once state and federal programs had to be integrated across the 
country. With a prefectorial logic, this areal coordination problem was met 
with proposals to “concentrate responsibility in a single official,” who could 
only be “the president of the United States.”133 
The Brownlow Committee likewise invoked the need to coordinate 
federal and state activity to make its case for presidential administration. The 
report cited chaos in national planning given the varied activities of regional, 
state, and local boards, and it called attention to regionally incongruent 
approaches to administration by the federal government.134 The “109 
different plans of geographical subdivision of the United States in use by the 
various governmental agencies” exacerbated problems of coordination 
among agencies that had “grown up without plan or design like the barns, 
 
131. Id. at 30. 
132. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 183. The report also states: 
Nor should we forget the very heavy responsibility which is placed, in our 
Government, upon the President and his colleagues in the formulating of 
administrative policy. While one may say that he is exercising Federal power alone, 
the fact is that every exercise of such power has its impact at local points somewhere 
in the area of the United States. 
Id. at 199. 
133. Leonard D. White, Public Administration, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
440, 443–44 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1930); see id. (“As the variety, extent 
and complexity of public administration developed, and its costs mounted, the need for coordination 
and central direction became urgent.”); see also NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 183 (arguing that 
presidential coordination was required “because the allotment of duties and responsibilities among 
national departments, among State departments, and among departments in local governments 
requires coordinated action among them for dealing adequately with many problems”); cf. Daniel 
J. Elazar, Is Federalism Compatible with Prefectorial Administration?, PUBLIUS, Spring 1981, at 3, 
7 (“[I]t is the essence of the prefectorial approach that hierarchical decision making, executed 
through a bureaucratic structure, should not only establish a chain-of-command but a power pyramid 
which comes to a single point at the top.”). 
134. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 35. 
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shacks, silos, tool sheds, and garages of an old farm.”135 To be sure, the 
Brownlow Committee’s argument for enhanced presidential control over 
administration did not depend on the challenge of intergovernmental 
coordination; the challenges it perceived within the federal government itself 
demanded a streamlined federal apparatus and a “responsible and effective 
chief executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative 
management.”136 But the need for intergovernmental coordination reinforced 
the argument for presidential control: the federal government had to be 
reduced to a single point, capable of taking “an overall view,”137 in order to 
interface effectively with other governments. 
3. Decentralized Centralization.—If federalism bolstered the 
coordination-based argument for presidential control over federal 
administration, it also moderated the claim, suggesting that presidential 
control need not amount to “overcentralization.”138 The NRC and Brownlow 
Committee cited geographical decentralization as a way to preserve local 
representation and even democratic responsiveness within a system of 
presidential administration. State, local, and regional participation could, 
they insisted, humanize a system that increasingly concentrated power in the 
chief executive. 
Both committees began from an assumption that the burgeoning federal 
administrative state shifted power to the executive branch from Congress.139 
This became most explicit in discussions of national planning, as the National 
Resources Board was expressly intended to “emancipate national policy from 
the inertia and parochialism of Congress.”140 Policymaking would 
increasingly be the responsibility of the executive rather than the legislature. 
The Brownlow Committee’s most direct response to the separation-of-
powers questions this raised came in the unconvincing statement that 
administrative management would improve the “[a]ccountability of the 
 
135. Id. at 29–30. 
136. Id. at 2. 
137. Id. at 26. 
138. Id. 
139. This was a trope of the day. See, e.g., White, supra note 133, at 442, 447 (noting concerns 
that the executive branch was “trench[ing] on the traditional duties of legislatures and courts,” but 
stating that “[a]dministration has come to such a varied, extensive and technical state that no body 
of men deriving from a political environment, rapidly changing in personnel, meeting intermittently 
and absorbed with pressing issues of public policy, can expect to act effectively as a board of 
directors”). 
140. MILKIS, supra note 117, at 129, 347 n.16 (quoting Notes of the Meeting of June 25, 1934 
with the President, Papers of the National Resources Planning Board); see also Alan Brinkley, The 
National Resources Planning Board and the Reconstruction of Planning, in THE AMERICAN 
PLANNING TRADITION 173, 181 (Robert Fishman ed., 2000) (noting that the National Resources 
Planning Board “served as a symbol to many members of Congress of their increasing irrelevance 
to basic policymaking”). 
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Executive to the Congress.”141 Adhering to the template of prior 
reorganization committees, the suggestion that “a coherent executive branch 
and responsible president are more easily held accountable by the legislature” 
marked the only part of the report to “embrace[] a dichotomous view of 
administration and politics.”142 
But if the authors of the Brownlow Report did not seem persuaded by 
this particular argument, they worried aloud about “autocracy”143 and 
“overcentralization.”144 What might counteract “excessive centralization” in 
an executive-centric government? Not the bureaucracy, certainly. In contrast 
to James Landis’s subsequent account,145 Brownlow and his colleagues were 
hostile to a “headless ‘fourth branch’”; they posited bureaucracy itself as a 
“dictatorial” threat.146 
Instead, they suggested, territorial decentralization was the appropriate 
“democratic” response to the consolidation of executive power.147 Neither the 
NRC nor the Brownlow Committee equated decentralization with federalism 
as such. They proposed that regional field offices of federal agencies would 
allow government to “be carried to the people . . . to make it fit their needs” 
and “to keep it from becoming distant and bureaucratic.”148 This sort of 
argument was potentially more radical than relying on the states: Congress, 
not the executive branch, was organized by area and constituted to represent 
state, local, and regional interests within the federal government, but these 
reports posited the executive branch as a territorial as well as functional 
creature. Reliance on federal regions only went so far, however. The 
committees argued not simply that regional units would bring the federal 
 
141. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 43–44. 
142. PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 106 (2d ed. 1998). 
143. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 47. 
144. Id. at 26. Notably, the Brownlow Report was published the winter after the three members 
of the Committee—Louis Brownlow, Charles Merriam, and Luther Gulick—and other public-
administration scholars had traveled to Europe and met with Hitler. In the years leading up to that 
meeting, they had justified cooperation with the Nazi government in Germany by insisting on a 
separation between administration and politics, but after the summer of 1936, they rejected their 
prior view that the two could be neatly separated, and passages in the Brownlow Report were 
intended to defend democracy against fascism. See Alasdair Roberts, Shaking Hands with Hitler: 
The Politics-Administration Dichotomy and Engagement with Fascism, 79 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 267, 
273 (2019). 
145. See LANDIS, supra note 105. 
146. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 30 (“The safeguarding of the citizen from narrow-
minded and dictatorial bureaucratic interference and control is one of the primary obligations of 
democratic government.”). 
147. Id. at 36. 
148. Id. Although Merriam disclaimed reliance on the academic studies he called 
“nonsupporting documents,” this argument was consistent with a suggestion in James Fesler’s study 
of the field service: that the real concern about expanded federal power was about the “centralized 
regimentation of the remotest hamlet by an unsympathetic bureaucracy” and that “humanizing 
Federal administration” and “orienting it with reference to the citizenry that it is intended to serve” 
might generate greater acceptance of national policymaking. James W. Fesler, Executive 
Management and the Federal Field Service, in BROWNLOW REPORT app. 277. 
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government “nearer to the people themselves” but also that they would allow 
the federal government to “better cooperate with State and local governments 
in the conduct of its affairs.”149 
It was in this return to cooperative federalism that the Brownlow 
Committee tried to strike a balance between centralization and 
decentralization. The federal executive branch would set national policy, but 
that national policy might in turn be geographically differentiated in the 
course of administration. Ultimately, the NRC and Brownlow Committees 
proposed, presidential superintendence could mark the diminishment of 
congressional authority, but the very interests Congress represented might be 
advanced through cooperative federalism and regional administration. 
B. Reprising the Argument 
Each of the Brownlow Committee’s claims—that administration had an 
ineluctably intergovernmental dimension; that this intergovernmental 
dimension bolstered the case for presidential control; and that incorporating 
states, localities, and regions into federal administration might decentralize 
and humanize executive-centric government—echoed across the twentieth 
century. Some thirteen years after the Brownlow Report, for example, the 
Hoover Commission linked intergovernmental relations and executive 
power. Noting that “a very large part of the executive and administrative task 
of the Federal government is concerned with problems, functions, and 
services involving Federal-State relations,” the Commission argued that 
intergovernmental relations demanded stronger presidential control over 
federal administration.150 
In the 1960s, the Great Society and expansion of federal funds flowing 
to states meant that the “President was increasingly staking his reputation in 
domestic affairs on the success or failure of new grant-in-aid programs.”151 
In response to this development, task forces established by Presidents 
Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon relied on decentralization and 
devolution to argue for greater presidential control. The Heineman Task 
 
149. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 30. 
150. U.S. COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, THE HOOVER COMMISSION 
REPORT 495 (1949). In dissent, Dean Acheson and James Forrestal argued that the Commission was 
exceeding its jurisdiction: established to make recommendations about the executive branch, it was 
exploring state–federal relations, including grants-in-aid, which lay “in the realm of legislative 
policy.” Id. at 25 n.1. That cooperative federalism was to be overseen by Congress rather than the 
president was, however, precisely what the majority of commissioners disputed. 
151. Gary Bombardier, The Managerial Function of OMB: Intergovernmental Relations as a 
Test Case, 23 PUB. POL’Y 317, 321–22 (1975). As the President was “drawn into the 
intergovernmental thicket,” he and his staff interacted directly with state and local “political leaders 
who [were] not always willing to accept the decisions of the President’s administrative subordinates 
in the executive departments.” Allen Schick, The Budget Bureau that Was: Thoughts on the Rise, 
Decline, and Future of a Presidential Agency, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 519, 538 (1970); 
Bombardier, supra at 322. 
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Force called for greater presidential staff and machinery “to control and pull 
together the related programs of Federal departments in Washington and in 
the field . . . [and] to reflect the Presidential perspective in program areas 
requiring cooperation between Federal agencies and between the Federal, 
State, and local governments.”152 It also echoed the Brownlow Committee’s 
appeal to centralized decentralization, suggesting that “far more 
decentralization of operational program decisions is essential, subject to 
precise policy guidance from Washington.”153 
Nixon’s Ash Council similarly cited the complexity of 
intergovernmental relations to justify presidential control. Consistent with 
the broader agenda of New Federalism “to decentralize major domestic 
decisionmaking activities from the Washington, D.C., level to federal 
regional agencies and to the states and local governments,”154 the Ash 
Council emphasized geographical decentralization—but at the expense of 
congressional and agency, not presidential, power.155 As Nixon put it, 
“Bringing power to the White House was necessary to dish it out.”156 
Decentralization and the “administrative presidency”157 went hand in hand, 
as the president sought to exercise power through a “vertical alliance” 
running from the White House to “statehouses and city halls.”158 
 
152. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON GOV’T ORG., THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF 
GREAT SOCIETY PROGRAMS 2, 4, 7 (1967) (Indiana University Libraries) (on file with author); see 
also id. at 4, 7 (proposing a new Office of Program Coordination that would exist alongside the 
Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Office of the President but also have a “field force organized 
in ten Federal regions” intended “to reflect the President’s perspective, concerns, and desires in 
program areas requiring cooperation between two or more Federal agencies, and State and local 
governments”). 
153. Id. Compare BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 30 (proposing “decentralizing the 
actual administrative operation” after “so centralizing the determination of administrative policy 
that there is a clear line of conduct laid down for all officialdom to follow”). 
154. AM. SOC’Y FOR PUB. ADMIN., THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW FEDERALISM: 
OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES 3 (1973). 
155. See ARNOLD, supra note 142, at 292–93 (“The political context within which the Ash 
Council formulated its views favored devolution. . . . But the clearly higher objective for the council 
was to make federal activities at local and regional levels conform to national (read ‘presidential’) 
priorities.”). 
156. MILKIS, supra note 117, at 227 (quoting Nixon). Leonard Garment, who served on Nixon’s 
White House legal staff, elaborated: “[T]he central paradox of the Nixon administration was that in 
order to reduce federal power, it was first necessary to increase presidential power.” Id. (quoting 
Garment). “Nixon felt . . . only a very strong president could ‘reverse the flow of power from the 
states and communities to Washington.’ Accordingly, his commitment to decentralization went 
hand in hand with a program of administrative reform that would help him accomplish his policy 
goals by executive fiat.” Id. (quoting Garment). 
157. RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). 
158. MARTHA A. DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 180 (1974); see also Herbert Kaufman, Administrative Decentralization and 
Political Power, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 3, 8 (1969) (considering how “decentralization” when 
“characterized as organization by area as opposed to the present almost exclusive organization by 
functional departments and bureaus” may strengthen central authority). 
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IV. The President and the States 
Although the overlap of state and federal policy domains has long led 
presidents to engage with the states, and presidential task forces have 
repeatedly emphasized states’ significance to questions of executive power 
and administrative management, contemporary accounts of presidential 
administration attend almost exclusively to federal agencies. In so doing, they 
neglect some of presidents’ most effective tools for setting domestic policy, 
from waivers and grants to nonpreemption of state law. They also neglect an 
important source of durability: state policies may outlast any president’s 
tenure, conferring resilience that federal agency action frequently lacks. 
Incorporating the states into understandings of presidential 
administration reveals not only additional resources for presidential 
policymaking, however, but also a set of actors who may oppose the 
president’s choices. If congenial state policymaking extends the president’s 
reach, antagonistic state policymaking limits it at the same time. Consistent 
with the Brownlow Committee’s suggestion, intergovernmental presidential 
administration calls for more nuanced conceptions of centralization and 
decentralization alike. States may help realize a president’s policy agenda 
and supply a justification for greater presidential supervision of federal 
administration, but so too do states diversify administrative policy and 
broaden the representative base for administrative action beyond the 
president herself. 
A. Federalism as a Tool of Presidential Administration 
1. Beyond Centralization and Politicization.—Especially given 
federalism’s role in formative accounts of presidential administration, we 
might expect it to feature as well in the contemporary literature. Why then do 
states figure marginally at best?159 Beyond disciplinary conventions that may 
lead administrative law scholars to study only federal institutions, the most 
likely reason is that states lie outside any plausible chain of command: 
presidents cannot demand that states carry out federal programs, submit state 
legislation to OIRA review, or the like.160 And states are not themselves 
 
159. A notable exception is Thomas Gais & James Fossett, Federalism and the Executive 
Branch, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra note 112, at 486, 502, 515 (arguing that devolution may 
enhance federal executive power and that “control over the presidency and a few governorships can 
be a sufficient base to launch important policy innovations”). 
160. See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018) (“The anticommandeering 
doctrine . . . is simply the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the 
Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the 
States.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither 
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ 
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may 
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory scheme.”). 
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federal agencies, however much they participate in federal administration. 
Thus, on Kagan’s centralization-focused account, it would be odd to regard 
state policymaking as an aspect of presidential administration rather than a 
distinct, if sometimes complementary, form of governance.161 
Even in Washington, however, presidential administration relies as 
much on politicization and agency officials who willingly align their 
policymaking with the president’s agenda as on centralization that brings 
decisions to the White House.162 If presidential administration need not 
depend on command but may be furthered through willing partnerships, state 
and local officials begin to look more similar to federal officials. States and 
the federal government regulate largely overlapping policy domains, and 
state and federal actors are closely linked both ideologically and 
organizationally through national political parties.163 Political polarization 
both dampens the significance of hierarchical control in Washington and 
facilitates presidential administration beyond Washington. 
If polarization underscores that intergovernmental coordination may be 
a technique of presidential administration, it also underscores why presidents 
would be particularly eager for state inputs: they require policymaking 
capacity beyond that available in federal agencies to carry out their agendas. 
Commentators often attribute the urgency of contemporary presidential 
administration to partisan polarization and divided government, which make 
legislative accomplishment difficult. But when presidents look beyond 
Congress to federal agencies to achieve their objectives, they may still come 
up short, or at least arguably so. The most significant challenges to executive 
action in recent years have not alleged that the president was overreaching 
vis-à-vis federal agencies; they have argued that federal agencies lacked 
authority to carry out presidentially instigated actions. This—not limits on 
presidential direction of agencies—was the story of President Obama’s major 
initiatives, from the Clean Power Plan to DAPA and DACA, and more.164 
Rapidly eclipsing the question of whether the president can control federal 
agencies is the question of whether these agencies can act. 
 
161. Although she did not consider state policymaking to be a tool of presidential 
administration, Kagan did note that many examples of Clinton’s presidential administration 
involved “the incorporation of state and local actors into the sphere of federal administration.” 
Kagan, supra note 17, at 2306–07; see also infra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (describing 
examples of intergovernmental presidential administration in Kagan’s account). 
162. See supra subpart I(B). 
163. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 
1082–108 (2014) (discussing the effects of partisan politics on state and federal government). 
164. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 
S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (enjoining DAPA and expansion of DACA); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating antidiscrimination and antiblocking requirements of FCC’s 2010 Open 
Internet Order); Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 80–81, West Virginia v. U.S. 
EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016) (challenging Clean Power Plan). See generally Daphna 
Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213 (2015) (arguing that presidential “power to” 
is a significant question alongside presidential “power over”). 
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This question will only loom larger if the Supreme Court continues to 
distinguish presidential power from administrative policymaking and to bless 
the former while curtailing the latter.165 Indeed, if this doctrinal development 
persists, a core question of past debates—whether the president is a “decider” 
or only an “overseer” of agency action166—will recede in favor of the former 
answer. But it will be an empty victory for those who see presidential 
administration as part of a “pro-regulatory governing agenda.”167 A “decider” 
role may give the president control over federal agencies, but that will be of 
little use if courts deem these agencies’ resulting decisions beyond their 
authority. Consideration of presidential administration must take into account 
both the president’s relationship to federal agencies and the ability of these 
agencies themselves to advance the president’s agenda. 
Understanding presidential administration to involve the president’s 
effectuation of a domestic policy agenda through administrative means—and 
not simply the president’s control over federal agencies—returns us to early, 
generative accounts of presidential administration. During the New Deal, the 
constitutional division of power meant that a range of domestic policy areas 
were understood to be reserved to the states. The NRC and Brownlow 
Committee appreciated that the president had to rely on cooperative 
federalism to achieve domestic policy objectives.168 The increase in grants-
in-aid during the Great Society likewise required presidents to engage with 
the states, as the Heineman Task Force and Ash Council explained.169 The 
question of the president’s control over administration has long included both 
the question of presidential control over federal agencies and the question of 
presidential direction of federal policy more broadly, including in 
conjunction with the states. 
Today’s issue is less one of constitutional authority than the scope of 
federal legislation: the necessity of “coordinated action”170 may not be 
apparent because Congress in almost all cases could confer authority on 
federal agencies. When a statute has not conferred such authority, however, 
the consequences for federal administrative action are not so different from 
a regime of dual federalism. Federal statutes that authorize federal agency 
action may also confer distinct responsibilities on state actors, making 
 
165. See supra subpart II(A). 
166. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 719–38 (2007); cf. Cary Coglianese, The 
Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 50, 69 (2017) (arguing that presidents already have numerous strategies to 
effectively direct agencies’ work without violating purported decisional limits). 
167. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249. 
168. See, e.g., supra Part III. 
169. See, e.g., supra notes 151–58 and accompanying text. 
170. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at vii. 
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cooperative federalism a statutory rather than constitutional imperative.171 
Collaboration with the states thus remains an important way for presidents to 
achieve policy objectives in the face of limited federal authority. 
2. Examples and Techniques.—Once we look for the states in the 
already-recognized domain of contemporary presidential administration, 
they are ubiquitous. Indeed, it is curious that states have been all but absent 
from the literature because they play an important role in Kagan’s own 
account. Presidential Administration highlights two examples of the 
phenomenon. One, the Department of Labor’s rule about paid parental leave, 
relied expressly on states from the start: President Clinton directed the 
Secretary of Labor “to issue a rule to allow States to offer paid leave to new 
mothers and fathers,” and the final rule granted states the flexibility to use 
unemployment insurance to provide such support.172 States were to be the 
primary actors furthering the President’s vision; the federal agency was only 
to facilitate state innovation.173 
The second example—an FDA rule limiting the marketing and 
advertising of tobacco to children174—had a subtler, but significant, 
federalism dimension. After the FDA promulgated a rule consistent with the 
President’s proclaimed objectives, the Supreme Court held that the rule 
exceeded the agency’s statutory authority.175 Presidential administration, 
understood solely as presidential direction of agency action, did not count for 
much because the agency did not have authority to act. Yet the demise of the 
federal rule did not mark the end of the policies it advocated: state and local 
governments pursued the regulatory objectives Clinton had outlined until 
Congress expressly conferred authority on the agency more than a decade 
later.176 Provisions in the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 and state 
 
171. See, e.g., Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1561, 1567 (2015) (noting that “federal-state collaboration” has become “the regulatory model 
of choice for policy initiatives big and small,” and arguing that consent procedures mediate “the 
power and influence of state and federal political actors”); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] 
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998 (2014) (“[F]ederalism now comes from federal statutes.”) 
(emphasis omitted); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (“Congress continues to enact ‘cooperative 
federalism’ regulatory programs that invite state agencies to implement federal law.”). 
172. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2284 (quoting Commencement Address at Grambling State 
University in Grambling, Louisiana, 1 PUB. PAPERS 836, 839 (May 23, 1999)). 
173. Subsequent presidents have continued to encourage states to develop programs rather than 
construct a federal paid-leave program. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DOL FACTSHEET: PAID 
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE (2015), https://www.dol.gov/wb/resources/paid_leave_fact
_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D5Y-KAKR] (“The President’s 2016 budget will include more than 
$2 billion in new funds to encourage States to develop paid family and medical leave programs.”). 
174. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2282–84. 
175. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
176. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3, 123 Stat. 
1776, 1781 (2009); see Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm 
of Agency Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 334, 337 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. et al. eds., 2011). 
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regulations restricting cigarette vending machines, smoking in public places, 
advertising, and the like—rather than federal agency rules—constituted the 
relevant “action to protect the young people of the United States from the 
awful dangers of tobacco.”177 
Other major initiatives of the Clinton Administration likewise joined 
federal agency action with state initiative. For instance, Clinton and the 
Department of Health and Human Services encouraged and granted waivers 
that allowed states to depart substantially from existing requirements of the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.178 George W. Bush also 
relied on intergovernmental collaboration when acting through 
administrative means. For instance, his administration granted states waivers 
to alter Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance programs, while his Faith-
Based Initiative sought to channel state and local social service contracts to 
religious organizations.179 
In the face of unyielding Republican opposition in Congress after his 
first two years in office, Obama more extensively conjoined federal and state 
administrative action. For example, he instructed the EPA to respond to 
climate change with a new regulatory program that directly engaged “with 
States, as they will play a central role in establishing and implementing 
standards for existing power plants.”180 The resulting Clean Power Plan was 
“based on” and intended to “reinforce the actions already being taken by 
states.”181 The Obama Administration also used waivers and grants to 
incentivize states to adopt educational standards in keeping with the federal 
executive’s priorities,182 and it granted states waivers to achieve broader 
participation in the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion and insurance 
 
177. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2283 (quoting The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1237 (Aug. 10, 1995)); see, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement 29 (1998), https://www.naag.org
/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUB7-T29U] (precluding settling 
tobacco companies from opposing “state or local legislative proposals or administrative rules . . . 
intended by their terms to reduce Youth access to, and the incidence of Youth consumption of, 
Tobacco”); Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and 
Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1224–36 (2014) (describing local tobacco regulation). 
178. Clinton “estimated that 75 percent of AFDC recipients were involved in waivers” by the 
time Congress enacted welfare reform. Gais & Fossett, supra note 159, at 508. 
179. Id. at 509, 513. 
180. Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39535, 39536 (July 1, 2013). 
181. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830, 34832 (proposed June 18, 2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60); see Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64665 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (noting 
that the Clean Power Plan is “designed to build on and reinforce progress by states, cities and 
towns”). 
182. See Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education Federalism, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. 565, 601–08 (2015); Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund Assessment 
Program; Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 
18171, 18171 (Apr. 9, 2010). 
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exchanges.183 In each of these cases, Obama superintended federal agency 
action in a manner consistent with existing accounts of presidential 
administration—he issued directives or instructions, for example, or claimed 
ownership of agency policies—but the President and federal agencies alike 
further depended on state policymaking. The Administration’s 
environmental, education, and healthcare initiatives simply could not have 
been achieved through federal agency action alone.184 
The Trump Administration has continued to rely on state and local 
policymaking. For instance, it has granted states waivers to impose work and 
other requirements on Medicaid recipients.185 It has supported efforts by 
states such as Texas to increase subnational participation in federal 
immigration enforcement well beyond that required by federal law.186 And it 
has issued a series of “Dear Governor” letters seeking to prompt state actions 
undoing Obama Administration environmental and healthcare policies.187 
These and other examples suggest that the catalog of tools commonly 
associated with presidential administration is incomplete. Including both the 
three techniques Kagan discussed (regulatory review, directives, and 
appropriation), which sound in centralization, as well as techniques her 
successors have studied, many of which sound in politicization, a list of 
recognized techniques would be: 
Regulatory Review. Presidents require agencies to submit any proposed 
major regulation (and sometimes any significant guidance document) to 
 
183. See John Dinan, Implementing Health Reform: Intergovernmental Bargaining and the 
Affordable Care Act, 44 PUBLIUS 399, 411 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is 
Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1730 (2018); Shanna Rose, Opting In, 
Opting Out: The Politics of State Medicaid Expansion, 13 FORUM 63, 76 (2015). 
184. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 953 (2016) (exploring and defending executive federalism as a form of joint state–federal 
policymaking, with a focus on the Obama Administration). 
185. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-
waiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state [https://perma.cc/5LYD-
R569] (listing pending and approved Section 1115 waivers by state). But see, e.g., Stewart v. Azar, 
366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 155–56 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that Kentucky’s work requirement was 
unlawful and vacating HHS’s approval). 
186. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States of America in Support of Texas’s Motion 
for a Stay Pending Appeal, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50762). 
See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2033–41 (2018) (describing state facilitation of and resistance to Obama and 
Trump Administration policymaking). 
187. E.g., Letter from Thomas E. Price, M.D., Sec’y, and Seema Verma, CMS Adm’r, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Governor (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default
/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q6Q-3B79]; Letter from Thomas E. Price, 
M.D., Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Governor (Mar. 13, 2017), https://
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/March-13-
2017-letter_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK95-CE7X]; Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, U.S. EPA, 
to Matt Bevin, Governor of Ky. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
03/documents/ky_bevin.pdf [https://perma.cc/S45L-FVHP]. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3463234
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427260 
BULMAN-POZEN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019 12:47 PM 
304 Texas Law Review [Vol. 98:265 
OMB, which assesses the regulation under cost–benefit analysis and may 
demand revisions of, delay, or reject proposed rules.188 
Directives. Presidents issue memoranda to agency heads instructing 
them to take certain actions that lie within their powers.189 
Appropriation. Presidents publicly assert ownership of agency actions 
through speeches, news conferences, social media, and the like.190 
Appointments. Presidents appoint politically responsive actors to 
positions in agencies.191 
Czars. Presidents designate White House officials to oversee agency 
policy in particular substantive areas.192 
Enforcement. Presidents oversee agency enforcement activity.193 
 
188. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (President Ronald Reagan); Exec. Order 
No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (President William Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13422, 3 C.F.R. 191 
(2008) (President George W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) (President Barack 
Obama); Exec. Order No. 13777, 3 C.F.R. 293 (2017) (President Donald Trump); see, e.g., DeMuth 
& Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 1076 (describing the emergence of White House regulatory review); 
Kagan, supra note 17, at 2285–90 (comparing Clinton’s regulatory review with Reagan’s); Watts, 
supra note 18, at 692–700 (describing reforms to regulatory review made by Bush and Obama). 
OMB also reviews agencies’ annual regulatory plans, and it has sometimes used “prompt” and 
“review” letters to shape the regulatory process in phases other than the proposed-to-final 
rulemaking stage. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 18, at 694–95. Scholars continue to debate whether 
OMB review is best understood as a form of presidential control. See supra note 35. 
189. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2290–99; Watts, supra note 18, at 691–703; Farber, 
supra note 18, at 23–25. 
190. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2299–303 (describing Clinton’s practice of publicly 
asserting ownership over agency action); Watts, supra note 18, at 703–04 (discussing Obama’s 
practice of public appropriation through online media). Appropriation both contributes to the 
president’s ability to shape administrative action and colors public perceptions about presidential 
control over agencies. See Coglianese & Firth, supra note 59, at 1904 (considering public 
perceptions). 
191. See, e.g., Moe, supra note 35, at 245 (describing the power of appointment as “perhaps 
more important than any other [the president] possesses”); see also, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 51, at 
7; Barron, supra note 51, at 1096; Livermore, supra note 55, at 49; Moe & Wilson, supra note 51, 
at 18. 
192. See, e.g., Saiger, supra note 57; Watts, supra note 18, at 704–05. President Obama in 
particular relied on czars to coordinate policy in areas such as energy and the environment, health 
care, and auto recovery. The early months of President Trump’s administration suggested a twist on 
this strategy, with presidential loyalists installed in federal agencies to monitor agency heads as a 
“shadow cabinet,” although this effort was short-lived. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald et al., Trump 
Starts Dismantling His Shadow Cabinet, POLITICO (May 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story
/2017/05/01/trump-starts-dismantling-his-shadow-cabinet-237819 [https://perma.cc/2W5U-
2Q2B]. 
193. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1124 
(2013) (calling attention to the significance of the president’s role in administrative enforcement 
and arguing for greater presidential coordination of agency enforcement). If the first round of 
literature on presidential control over administration focused on executive branch organization and 
the second focused on rulemaking, see, e.g., SEIDMAN, supra note 31, at 103, recent accounts, 
including Professor Andrias’s, reflect a shift in agency policymaking away from notice-and-
comment rulemaking to other tools, including guidance and enforcement policy. 
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Budget. OMB prepares the president’s budget and oversees agencies’ 
execution of the budget.194 
Pooling. Presidents integrate legal and policy resources dispersed across 
multiple agencies to achieve desired ends.195 
These are important techniques by which presidents shape federal 
agency action, but they are not the only ones. Moreover, they are useful only 
insofar as federal agencies already possess authority to advance the 
president’s policy ends. If agencies lack statutory authority to promulgate a 
certain rule, for example, it is of no moment that the president may direct 
them to do so (or review or personally appropriate their activity).196 
Especially given the emerging judicial skepticism of agency action, limits on 
the president’s “power to” may be more significant than those on her “power 
over.”197 
It is here that states come squarely into view. Intergovernmental 
cooperation expands the field for presidential administration through the 
following tools198: 
Waivers. Presidents and federal agencies exempt states from particular 
statutory or regulatory requirements or allow states to substitute their own 
policy choices.199 (For example, Clinton’s welfare waivers.200) 
 
194. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 
YALE L.J. 2182, 2211–14 (2016) (exploring how the White House is able to control agency 
policymaking through OMB’s preparation of the budget, oversight of agency execution of the 
budget, and creation of various management initiatives through the budget process). 
195. Renan, supra note 164, at 244 (arguing that, although agencies may also combine resources 
on their own, presidents have “both the incentives and the institutional capabilities to nurture 
pooling”); see also Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1174 (2012) (exploring “the President’s special burden, heightened 
incentive, and unique capacity to spur [interagency] coordination specifically through centralized 
supervision”); Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 224 (2013) 
(“[I]nteragency administration can be a boon for executive power.”). 
196. See, e.g., supra notes 172–77, 180–84 and accompanying text (discussing administrative 
policies of Presidents Clinton and Obama that could not be implemented by federal agencies alone). 
197. See Renan, supra note 164, at 213. 
198. For discussions of techniques presidents use to influence state policymaking, see generally 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Gillian Metzger, The President and the States: Patterns of Contestation 
and Collaboration Under Obama, 46 PUBLIUS 308, 314, 320–25 (2016), and Gais & Fossett, supra 
note 159. 
199. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, supra note 198, at 315–18; Gais & Fossett, supra note 
159, at 508–11; Bryan Shelly, The Bigger They Are: Cross-State Variation in Federal Education 
and Medicaid Waivers, 1991–2008, 43 PUBLIUS 452, 452–55 (2013); Frank J. Thompson & 
Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications for 
Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 971 (2007); see also David J. 
Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267 (2013) 
(defending delegation of power to agencies “to unmake law Congress has made”). 
200. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3463234
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427260 
BULMAN-POZEN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019 12:47 PM 
306 Texas Law Review [Vol. 98:265 
Grants. Presidents and federal agencies offer financial incentives to 
induce states to adopt particular policies.201 (For example, Obama’s Race to 
the Top program that granted states funds to overhaul their education systems 
consistent with Administration priorities.202) 
Rulemaking Incorporation. Presidents and federal agencies adopt 
regulations that build state law or policy into federal rules.203 (For example, 
the Clean Power Plan that incorporated state and regional cap-and-trade 
plans.204) 
Nonpreemption. Presidents and federal agencies permit state law to 
stand in areas also regulated by federal law.205 (For example, the Trump 
Administration’s decision not to challenge certain state immigration laws and 
to defend these state laws against other parties’ preemption challenges.206) 
Nonenforcement. Presidents and federal agencies decide not to enforce, 
or to reduce enforcement of, federal law based on conflicting state law.207 
(For example, the Obama Administration’s decision to minimize 
enforcement of federal law with respect to marijuana in states that had 
legalized the drug.208) 
 
201. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, supra note 198, at 317–19; Valentino Larcinese et al., 
Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The Impact of the President, 68 J. POL. 447 (2006); 
Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Leaving Money on the Table: Learning from Recent Refusals of Federal 
Grants in the American States, 42 PUBLIUS 449 (2012). 
202. See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, 
Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in 
Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522 (2011). 
203. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable 
Care Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 441 (2014); Bulman-Pozen & 
Metzger, supra note 198, at 321–22. 
204. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
205. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 1024–25; Memorandum from the White House 
for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (May 20, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/realitycheck/the_press_office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption [https://perma.cc
/PCY3-R5AU] (“The purpose of this memorandum is to state the general policy of my 
Administration that preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be 
undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a 
sufficient legal basis for preemption.”). 
206. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. In contrast, the Obama Administration 
challenged Arizona’s immigration law, and the Supreme Court held much of the state law 
preempted. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012). 
207. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, supra note 198, at 324–25; Cristina M. Rodríguez, 
Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 
2094, 2107 (2014). 
208. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., for All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 
2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc
/88G7-QP38]; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 980–82. 
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Encouragement. Presidents and federal agencies prod the adoption of 
congenial policies as state law.209 (For example, Obama’s push to expand the 
minimum wage as a matter of state law.210) 
Not all concordant state and federal policymaking should be regarded 
as a form of presidential administration, as the “encouragement” category, 
especially, might suggest. The simple fact that a state adopts a policy favored 
by the president is not sufficient reason to attribute that policy to the 
president, but negotiations and other interactions between the state and the 
federal executive can make the case. 
These various tools—waiver, grants, rulemaking, nonpreemption, 
nonenforcement, and encouragement—expand the reach of presidential 
administration. Their exercise generally involves presidential direction of 
federal agencies; for instance, the president might instruct the Department of 
Health and Human Services to give a state a waiver, she might work with the 
Department of Education to confer grants on particular states, or she might 
use White House czars to interact directly with state officials. But by 
collaborating with states, presidents achieve ends they cannot through federal 
agency action alone. Especially as presidents confront judicially imposed 
limits on federal agency action, intergovernmental presidential 
administration is likely to become even more prominent in shaping domestic 
policy. 
B. An Ambivalent Tool 
Has federalism become simply one more tool of presidential control in 
an executive-dominant system? Looking only at presidential initiation of 
intergovernmental collaboration may yield that conclusion: presidents reach 
out to friendly states when they cannot achieve desired ends through new 
legislation or purely federal administrative action.211 As the NRC and 
Brownlow Committees suggested, however, presidential reliance on the 
states is not purely president-aggrandizing; decentralization may be both a 
strategy for and also an antidote to the concentration of executive power. 
 
209. See, e.g., Thomas Kalil, Policy Entrepreneurship at the White House: Getting Things Done 
in Large Organizations, 11 INNOVATIONS 4, 11 (2017) (describing the Obama Administration’s use 
of a “call to action” to enlist states to help the Administration meet policy goals); Gregory Korte, 
To Get Around Congress, Obama Turns to City Halls, USA TODAY (May 26, 2015, 8:34 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/05/25/obama-state-and-local-strategy
/27602149/ [https://perma.cc/284A-YVXU]. 
210. See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli, Democratic Governors Join Obama in Push for Higher 
Minimum Wage, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/21
/news/la-pn-obama-governors-minimum-wage20140221 [https://perma.cc/XB4L-569V]. 
211. Indeed, such collaborations may not only increase presidential power in Washington but 
also enhance federal control over state and local governments. See generally James W. Fesler, 
Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization, 27 J. POL. 536, 565 (1965) 
(“Decentralization from a national government to a provincial government or regional 
administrative office may actually tighten centralized controls over local governments and district 
administrative offices.”); Gais & Fossett, supra note 159, at 515–16. 
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Federalism enhances presidential policymaking capacity in a different 
manner from many other capacity-building strategies. It depends on a cadre 
of actors with their own constituencies, electoral responsibilities, and 
pluralism of viewpoints.212 Presidential reliance on state policymaking and 
implementation to effectuate a domestic agenda empowers independent 
actors within the administrative realm. 
Even when presidents affirmatively seek state cooperation, the resulting 
state action is therefore often not entirely in line with their interests. Co-
partisans who share high-level goals may disagree about the particulars, and 
states may possess constitutional or statutory entitlements, or political rather 
than strictly legal powers, that give them leverage when the president seeks 
to enlist their help. The Obama Administration’s negotiations with states 
about expanding Medicaid coverage in the wake of NFIB v. Sebelius213 
furnish a high-profile illustration of how state–federal interactions may be 
more mutual than a top-down account of presidential administration 
suggests.214 Lower profile negotiations are pervasive.215 
Moreover, states do not participate in federal administration only at the 
invitation of the current president. Sometimes they are carrying out parts of 
a federal statutory regime at Congress’s invitation.216 Sometimes they are 
engaged in their own independent policymaking in a space also occupied by 
the federal government. Sometimes they are continuing an administrative 
program designed by a prior president. As that last possibility indicates, states 
do not support or oppose presidential policy as a general matter; they support 
or oppose particular presidents and particular policies. Just as the president 
is best conceptualized as a political location rather than an individual, so too 
 
212. Notably this is a point about state and local governments as such—not federal 
administrative regions, which the NRC and Brownlow Committee relied on for their decentralized 
vision. Although federal regions may continue to diversify administrative policy and to insulate 
certain decisions from presidential control, they are relatively obscure components of government 
that lack forms of independence and the representative connection to the people possessed by the 
states themselves. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, 
Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System 111 (Feb. 24, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6121& 
context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/6NA3-TZNU] (arguing that the “cultural salience” 
of administrative regions is “approximately zero”). Even as it hoped that planning regions might 
elicit a regional consciousness, the NRC itself appreciated in the 1930s that “no Californian ever 
boasted of living within the Twelfth Federal Reserve District; no Washingtonian of being a resident 
of the Fourth Procurement Zone.” NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 157. 
213. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
214. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 59, at 1772–86. 
215. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 280 (2011) (noting the 
pervasiveness of state–federal bargaining). 
216. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of 
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012) (describing how state administration of federal law can 
constrain federal executive power). 
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do state actors instantiate broader partisan and ideological commitments.217 
In a two-party system, this means state opposition to one president will often 
entail support for her predecessor or her successor. 
1. Presidential Administrations.—Considering multiple presidential 
administrations offers a useful lens on states’ role. For example, states that 
were leading implementers of Obama’s initiatives now find themselves 
defending those initiatives—and opposing Trump’s reversals.218 These states 
have numerous ways to side with a prior administration against the current 
one. Perhaps the most visible is litigation: state-led challenges to the federal 
executive have become more prominent in the past decade, as red states 
challenged Obama Administration policies and blue states have challenged 
Trump Administration policies.219 When they litigate as separate sovereigns, 
however, states tend to resemble private opponents of presidential policy; 
they may have a distinct path into the courthouse, but their arguments could 
be made by other plaintiffs as well. 
States have a unique, and more powerful, position when they operate 
within the administrative domain.220 For example, states may withhold their 
cooperation from a new enforcement policy. If the federal government is 
dependent on states to execute federal law, states may choose not to 
accommodate any given administration’s priorities. In the past two years, 
uncooperative states have limited the extent to which President Trump’s 
rejection of President Obama’s immigration policies has been realized. At 
the same time as Texas mandates broader state assistance to ICE than federal 
law contemplates,221 California curtails its assistance and thereby limits the 
 
217. See generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163 (explaining political actors’ use of both 
national and state institutions to advance their partisan goals); see supra subpart I(B) and text 
accompanying note 30. 
218. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
219. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 851 (2016); Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of 
Polarization, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 43 (2018). 
220. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (exploring how states use regulatory power conferred by the federal 
government to resist federal policy choices); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 216 (exploring how states 
use regulatory power conferred by Congress to resist presidential choices, in particular); Jean 
Galbraith, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2131 
(2017) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: 
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016)) (considering how states both enhance and 
complicate the president’s foreign-affairs power); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 
Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33–44 (2010) (discussing 
states’ “power of the servant”). Sometimes, state litigation itself depends on the state’s role in a 
federal scheme. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing 
and “The New Process Federalism,” 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739 (2017) (considering how states’ 
representative role in federal statutory schemes may confer standing to challenge the allocation and 
exercise of authority in the federal government). 
221. See Tex. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (preventing local entities from prohibiting peace 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3463234
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427260 
BULMAN-POZEN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019 12:47 PM 
310 Texas Law Review [Vol. 98:265 
reach of federal enforcement in its borders.222 Even if Trump may direct the 
activity of the relevant federal agencies, then, that alone is not sufficient to 
control immigration policy. The federal executive branch relies on state 
cooperation to achieve its objectives, but states’ legal and political 
independence allows them to set the terms of their participation, including by 
rejecting policy choices of the current administration. 
Notably, although California and other “sanctuary” jurisdictions make 
arguments sounding in state sovereignty to defend their policies against legal 
challenge, their broader commitments echo the Obama Administration’s 
deferred-action guidance. State and local governments, including California, 
Massachusetts, and New York City, do not limit all cooperation with ICE; 
instead, they train state resources on violent and other serious criminal 
offenses as the Obama Administration’s policies sought to do.223 
States may also keep a federal regulatory program disfavored by the 
current president alive within their borders. Although the Trump 
Administration has rescinded the Clean Power Plan,224 for example, a number 
of states are continuing to comply with their obligations and to adopt new 
commitments to renewable energy.225 This continuity is facilitated by the 
Clean Power Plan’s own reliance on state efforts. Recognizing the role of 
numerous states—most notably California and the northeastern states 
participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)—in 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions, the Obama Administration 
incorporated state efforts into the federal rule. Now, states are furthering 
these efforts despite the rollback of the federal rule. State officials argue both 
that they are resisting Trump’s agenda and that they are advancing policy 
commitments they shared with the Obama Administration.226 
 
officers from gathering information about an individual’s immigration status or detaining him or 
her for immigration authorities). 
222. See California Values Act, S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (prohibiting law 
enforcement agencies from gathering information about a person’s immigration status or detaining 
him or her for immigration authorities). 
223. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282.5, 7284.2(b)–(c), 7284.6 (West 2019). California and 
other jurisdictions permit law enforcement officers to transfer individuals and share information 
with federal agents if these individuals have been convicted of certain crimes. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T 
CODE §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a) (West 2019). 
224. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
(July 8, 2019). 
225. See supra note 12. 
226. See, e.g., Statement from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo (Oct. 10, 2017), https://
www.governor.ny.gov/news/statement-governor-andrew-m-cuomo-162 [https://perma.cc/SE7Z-
5386] (“While the Trump Administration takes a back [] seat to the rest of the world, New York . . . 
will continue to lead the fight to meet the standards set forth in both the Paris Accord and the Clean 
Power Plan.”); see also State Reactions to Trump Repealing the Clean Power Plan, GEO. CLIMATE 
CTR. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/articles/state-reactions-to-trump-
repealing-the-clean-power-plan.html [https://perma.cc/YWJ2-4GVE] (collecting similar statements 
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In addition, states may reinstate now-disfavored federal policy as state 
policy through their independent initiative. A number of states have codified 
as state law versions of the net-neutrality policy the FCC adopted under 
Obama and has withdrawn under Trump.227 Using repealed federal policy as 
a guide, these states are actively seeking to “restore” the open-internet 
protections.228 Florida and other states have likewise adopted offshore 
drilling restrictions imposed by the Obama Administration and withdrawn 
under Trump.229 California has codified the affirmatively furthering fair 
housing policy adopted by Obama’s Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and rescinded by Trump’s HUD.230 Nevada has reinstated the 
Obama-era fiduciary rule through state legislation.231 
As noted above, these state actions can fairly be understood as either an 
extension of or a limitation on presidential policymaking—or, perhaps more 
accurately, both at once. On the one hand, state legislative and executive 
decisions provide durability that federal presidential administration lacks. 
With President Obama out of office and federal agencies rescinding rules, 
guidance, and the like, states may entrench presidential policies in a way 
federal actors cannot. The oft-invoked rhetoric of “restoration” is apt, 
particularly because states are self-consciously designing their own 
legislation, rules, enforcement policies, and more with reference to prior 
federal policies; they are not adopting entirely new policies so much as 
shifting disavowed federal policies into state forms. On the other hand, the 
same states that are providing an afterlife for Obama-era policies are actively 
rejecting President Trump’s administrative decisions. If the rhetoric of 
“restoration” applies, so too does the more popular rhetoric of “resistance.” 
This dual character relates to a second key point: any given state might 
be said to be extending a prior administration’s policies or opposing a current 
administration’s policies, but there is not only one state. Some states can be 
expected to support a particular president’s agenda, while others—
 
by state officials). See generally Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (arguing that interactions between the federal government and the 
states have spurred regulatory innovation). 
227. See supra notes 4, 6 & 15 and accompanying text. 
228. Johnson, supra note 15. 
229. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (amended 2018); Assemb. B. 1775, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. 
(codified at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6245 (West 2018)); S.B. 200, 149th Gen. Assemb., 2d Spec. 
Sess. (codified at 81 Del. Laws § 442 (2018)); STOP Offshore Oil and Gas Act, Assemb. B. 839, 
218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (codified at N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:19-47 to -51 (2018)). 
230. Assemb. B. 686, 2017–2018 Sess., Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8899.50, 
65583, 65583.2 (West 2019)). 
231. S.B. 383, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 628A.010, 628A.040, 
688C.212 (West 2019)); see also John Manganaro, State-Based Fiduciary Regulations Take Shape 
in 2019, PLAN ADVISOR (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/exclusives/state-based-
fiduciary-regulations-take-shape-2019/ [https://perma.cc/8NX6-SF5D] (describing how regulators 
and legislators in numerous states are “pushing to fill a perceived void created by federal 
deregulation”). 
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principally those controlled by the opposite party—can be expected to oppose 
this agenda. To be sure, the references to California throughout this 
discussion are not a coincidence; some states are “more equal than others” 
when it comes to regulatory capacity and influence.232 But there are more and 
less powerful red and blue states alike. Texas will not agree with California; 
Rhode Island will not agree with Alabama. The state role is necessarily 
multivalent. 
2. Courts and Congress.—The most apparent lesson to be gleaned from 
recent practice is for presidents themselves: if a president wants her 
regulatory preferences to outlast her administration, she should embrace 
cooperation with, even reliance on, states as a vehicle for promoting policy 
stability. The contours of intergovernmental presidential administration are 
necessarily determined not only by states and the federal executive branch, 
however, but also by other actors. In particular, state efforts to perpetuate or 
restore federal policy—and, in so doing, to oppose the current president’s 
administrative policies—are vulnerable to legal challenge and judicial 
invalidation. 
Recognizing risks of regulatory volatility, commentators have recently 
called for courts to more closely scrutinize federal agencies’ policy reversals 
pursuant to APA arbitrary-and-capricious review.233 But also important is the 
space courts leave for states to act. When federal agencies change course, are 
states prohibited from adhering to a previous policy or reinstating it as a 
matter of state law? Existing doctrine already reserves some space for the 
states. The anticommandeering principle, recently reaffirmed in Murphy v. 
NCAA,234 prevents the federal executive branch from compelling states to 
regulate in accord with its preferences.235 For example, sanctuary 
jurisdictions need not lend support to federal immigration enforcement.236 
 
232. See generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995) (describing the “California effect”). 
233. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law for an Era of 
Partisan Volatility 34–37 (November 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3278745 [https://perma.cc/CXP5-NFQU] (suggesting that judicial scrutiny could help 
“mitigate the costs of political instability”); see also Josh Blackman, Presidential 
Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 397, 405–08, 411, 413, 415–16, 422 (describing 
presidential reversals as a species of maladministration that may warrant judicial skepticism). 
234. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
235. Id. at 1484–85 (holding unconstitutional a federal law banning state government 
“authorization” of sports gambling under state law); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
236. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 234–35 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of Philadelphia 
v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 329 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d in relevant part, 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d 
Cir. 2019). See generally Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and 
the New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87 (2016) (discussing state refusals to 
assist federal immigration-enforcement efforts); Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How 
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Whether state policies reflect independent state judgment or an attempt to 
advance a broader national commitment is of no moment; the federal 
government may not “dragoon[]” states into “administering federal law” 
regardless of the reasons states reject cooperation.237 
More complicated questions arise with respect to preemption. Almost 
immediately upon their enactment, for instance, the Trump Administration 
argued that California’s immigration and net-neutrality laws were 
preempted.238 On its logic, California could not adopt distinct policies from 
the federal executive because federal law displaced contrary state 
approaches. Beyond the limits anticommandeering doctrine itself sets on 
such claims,239 courts should be wary of executive preemption—attempts to 
displace state policymaking that come from the executive branch rather than 
Congress.240 To be sure, the president and federal agencies will often defend 
their decisions with reference to an underlying statute rather than autonomous 
executive power; in challenging California, the Trump Administration has 
cited the Communications Act, Immigration and Nationality Act, and other 
 
the Trump Administration’s Attack on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial 
Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 1247 (2019) (exploring litigation concerning state 
refusals to cooperate with Trump immigration-enforcement efforts). 
237. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. 
238. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, United States v. California, 
No. 2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file
/1097306/download [https://perma.cc/C6L9-8A4K] (arguing that California’s net-neutrality law is 
preempted); Complaint at 3, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal. 
Mar. 6, 2018), 2018 WL 1181625 (arguing that California’s sanctuary-state law is preempted); 
Brian Fung, California Agrees Not to Enforce Its Net Neutrality Law as Justice Dept. Puts Lawsuit 
on Hold, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/26
/california-agrees-not-enforce-its-net-neutrality-law-trumps-doj-puts-its-lawsuit-hold/?utm
_term=.46ad24ad7a02 [https://perma.cc/PA6A-WHSS] (describing agreement that DOJ will 
postpone litigation challenging California’s net-neutrality law and California will not enforce the 
rules on broadband providers). But see Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, No. 18-1051, 2019 WL 4777860, at 
*60, *62 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2019) (vacating the portion of the 2018 FCC Order purporting to preempt 
any state or local requirements inconsistent with the FCC’s deregulatory approach but leaving open 
the question whether particular state laws are preempted by other portions of the 2018 Order); 
United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting, at preliminary 
injunction stage, several arguments that California’s sanctuary-state law is preempted). 
239. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 186, at 2043–47 (exploring the intersection between 
preemption and commandeering with respect to immigration policy). 
240. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 695, 698–99 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 870, 
881 (2008). Executive nonpreemption—federal executive branch efforts to insulate state action 
from preemption—is a different matter. Agencies should receive greater deference for 
determinations that state law is not preempted than that it is. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 
1023–25. 
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federal statutes.241 But the critical preemptive decisions are coming from the 
executive branch, not Congress.242 
This is in substantial part because the most contentious executive branch 
policymaking of recent years has concerned questions about which Congress 
has not clearly spoken (e.g., climate change, net neutrality, parameters of 
immigration enforcement).243 As some scholars have argued, it makes sense 
to give federal agencies latitude to regulate in these areas; they are better 
positioned than courts to answer new questions, so “it may be more 
‘democratic’ to defer during fallow legislative periods to the agencies, rather 
than revert to a judicially imposed and indefinite extension of the status 
quo.”244 But to acknowledge this is simply to acknowledge the limits of 
democratic inputs at the federal level. Bringing in the states offers a path 
around some of these limits,245 a path courts can preserve by distinguishing 
federal agency policymaking from federal agency latitude to preempt the 
states.246 
If intergovernmental presidential administration contains lessons for 
presidents and the courts, it also speaks to Congress: the case against 
preemption is particularly strong if Congress has expressly conferred 
authority on the states as, for example, in the paradigmatic case of the Clean 
Air Act. Indeed, the Bush and Trump Administrations’ attempts to deny 
California Clean Air Act waivers have been some of the most egregious 
examples of presidential unilateralism insofar as they seek to override a 
specific statutory entitlement with executive diktat.247  
 
241. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 238, at 2–3, 5 (arguing that California’s sanctuary-state 
law is preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986, and other federal laws regulating immigration); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, supra note 238, at 1 (arguing that California’s net-neutrality law is preempted by the federal 
Communications Act, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
242. Consistent with the argument here, courts have been skeptical of the Trump 
Administration’s broadest preemption arguments. In particular, although the D.C. Circuit largely 
upheld the FCC’s 2018 Order revoking net neutrality, it rejected the Order’s Preemption Directive 
that would have prevented any state from imposing a requirement inconsistent with the FCC’s 
“deregulatory approach.” Mozilla Corp., 2019 WL 4777860, at *50. The court reasoned that this 
express Preemption Directive was not grounded in statutory authority. See id. at *54 (“[T]he power 
to preempt the States’ laws must be conferred by Congress. It cannot be a mere byproduct of self-
made agency policy.”). The Ninth Circuit likewise rejected several of the Trump Administration’s 
most sweeping arguments about preemption in the immigration context. See United States v. 
California, 921 F.3d at 894–95 (affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s partial 
preliminary injunction against California’s sanctuary-state law). 
243. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 93; Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New 
Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law 
Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501 (2015). 
244. Freeman & Spence, supra note 243, at 76. 
245. See infra Part V. 
246. The D.C. Circuit’s recent decision concerning net neutrality draws just such a distinction. 
See Mozilla Corp., 2019 WL 4777860, at *50; supra note 242. 
247. See Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National 
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The invocation of Congress here is necessarily limited. A premise of 
intergovernmental presidential administration is that, although Congress may 
retain paramount authority, it exercises it sparingly enough that the policy 
domain is largely executive. Without positing federal lawmaking as a 
solution to administration’s discontents, however, we must acknowledge its 
role in shaping this executive domain. In particular, during periods of unified 
party government, Congress often has two years to pass legislation broadly 
setting parameters for future administrative governance. It may be tempting 
when the next such window arises for ambitious members of Congress to 
advocate unitary national solutions in various areas, from climate change to 
healthcare. But instead of reflexively cutting out the states, senators and 
representatives should be mindful of how future administrations may 
undermine their objectives. If past is prologue, state discretion is more likely 
to be championed by the detractors than proponents of any particular policy, 
but delegating authority to both the federal executive branch and the states 
can better secure proponents’ ambitions over time, including by allowing 
states to keep alive and refine regulatory policies that a new federal 
administration revokes.248 
V. Reconsidering Presidential Administration 
Both New Deal theories of administration, forged as the United States 
moved from a principally legislative to a principally executive order, and 
developments in government practice and politics in the years since illustrate 
the important role of the states. This Part returns to some contemporary 
questions about presidential administration with this landscape more fully in 
view. As Kagan argued in making her normative case, “All models of 
administration must address two core issues: how to make administration 
 
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310, 51328–61 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85–86) 
(withdrawing the 2013 waiver of preemption of California’s Advanced Clean Car program); 
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver 
of Clean Air Act Preemption, 73 Fed. Reg. 12156, 12159–64 (Mar. 6, 2008) (denying California a 
waiver of preemption of emissions standards for new motor vehicles). A challenge to the Bush 
EPA’s waiver denial was dismissed on the parties’ joint motion after the Obama EPA granted the 
waiver. See California v. EPA, No. 08-1178 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 2008). A challenge to the Trump 
EPA’s waiver revocation is pending. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
California v. Chao, Case No. 1:19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019), http://
blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents
/2019/20190920_docket-119-cv-02826_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9CW-PC95]. 
248. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate 
Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1089, 1094–97 (arguing that retaining concurrent federal and 
state authority can hedge risks of regulatory reversal and implementation failure); cf. Jacob E. 
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 
201, 212 (“Giving authority to multiple agencies and allowing them to compete against each other 
can bring policy closer to the preferences of Congress than would delegation to a single agent.”). 
The prospects are better when the multiple agents are the states and the federal executive branch 
rather than multiple federal agencies because federal agencies can be controlled by the president in 
a way the states cannot. 
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accountable to the public and how to make administration efficient or 
otherwise effective.”249 She contended that the presidential model fared 
better than the alternatives. As presidential administration has grown 
stronger, however, the already-tentative case for presidential direction of 
administration has become increasingly fraught. “Accountability” and 
“effectiveness,” in particular, may scan as more autocratic than 
democratic.250 States’ role in both furthering and constraining presidential 
direction of administration introduces salutary complexity. Inter-
governmental presidential administration is superior to purely federal 
presidential administration, even on the terms set by Kagan’s account. 
A. Accountability 
Kagan’s principal defense of presidential administration sounded in 
accountability to the public.251 While acknowledging that “responsiveness to 
the general electorate” was not the only criterion by which to assess 
administration,252 she argued that on this necessary-if-insufficient criterion, 
presidential control was superior to its alternatives: as a unitary and visible 
office, the presidency rendered administration more transparent,253 and as the 
only official elected by a national constituency focused on national issues, 
the president was “likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative 
policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than 
merely parochial interests.”254 Compared to the president, she insisted, civil 
servants, political appointees, interest groups, and members of congressional 
committees had “a far more tenuous connection to national majoritarian 
preferences and interests.”255 
This account was controversial from the start. Some of the most 
emphatic challenges focused on a plebiscitary account of presidential power, 
 
249. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2331. 
250. See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE 143–74 (2009); Jud Mathews, Minimally 
Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 605, 633–34 (2016). 
251. “Accountability” bears many different meanings. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) 
(presenting a partial taxonomy). This discussion follows Kagan’s focus on electoral accountability. 
252. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2336. 
253. Id. at 2332–33. 
254. Id. at 2335. Kagan recognized that this responsiveness argument might be retrospective as 
well as prospective—i.e., as the only official elected by a national constituency focused on national 
issues, the president might be understood to have a mandate, at least with respect to salient issues. 
See id. at 2334–35. But she appeared at best ambivalent about the retrospective version of the 
argument, insisting instead on the force of the prospective claim. See id. at 2334. (“[E]ven assuming 
a popular majority for a presidential candidate, bare election results rarely provide conclusive 
grounds to infer similar support for even that candidate’s most important positions, much less the 
sometimes arcane aspects of regulatory policy. Presidential claims of prior public validation indeed 
often have a tinny timbre.”). 
255. Id. at 2336. 
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which Kagan had attempted to distinguish.256 The risks such commentators 
recognized of grounding administrative legitimacy in a single election have 
only grown starker: like George W. Bush before him, Trump does not even 
possess whatever mandate may follow from winning the popular vote.257 
More problematic for Kagan’s prospective account, Trump has not sought to 
further “the preferences of the general public” after assuming office.258 To 
the contrary, his administration illustrates the potential conflation of 
presidentialism and authoritarianism,259 as well as of “national majoritarian 
preferences” and white-nationalist populism. 
Concerns about presidentialism as a mode of administrative 
accountability run deeper than the Trump Administration’s particular 
pathologies, however, because of how thoroughly presidential administration 
has vanquished its competitors. Recognizing that the most powerful 
criticisms of presidential administration contrasted presidentialism with 
pluralism,260 Kagan responded that the question was not whether “the 
president is better . . . than a pluralist system” but rather whether “greater or 
lesser presidentialism within pluralism” was preferable given pluralism’s 
inevitability.261 As presidential administration has grown more capacious 
over the past two decades, however, this hedge has become less satisfying. 
The institutions and practices recognized as composing the pluralist 
system—in particular Congress and agency officials, but also interest 
groups—have been either marginalized or assimilated into the practice of 
presidential administration itself.262 Critics who dispute Kagan’s 
“comparative” case tend to insist that Congress or agency heads furnish at 
least as much public accountability as the president,263 yet that rejoinder is 
largely beside the point in an executive-centered party system where agency 
 
256. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 250. See generally Mathews, supra note 250, at 633 (arguing 
that the “strongly plebiscitary form” of presidentialism “treats national elections, by themselves, as 
sufficient to legitimate the subsequent acts of the President,” so that “the removal of obstacles to 
executive power” is understood to be “democracy-enhancing”). 
257. Kagan was skeptical of such “prior public validation” claims, see supra note 254, and was 
herself writing in the wake of the 2000 election, so she recognized that “winning a national election 
does not necessarily entail winning more votes than any other candidate.” Kagan, supra note 17, at 
2334. 
258. Id. at 2335. 
259. See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 250, at 633–34 (discussing plebiscitary accounts of 
presidentialism and cautioning that a “conception of democracy this thin offers no principled basis 
for a critique of autocratic government, so long as it features periodic elections”). 
260. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 98, at 988–89 (arguing that only a “plurality of institutions 
and practices” can legitimize the regulatory state); Shane, supra note 48, at 212 (concluding that 
accountability depends on “the availability of multiple pressure points within the bureaucracy”); 
Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 965 (1997) (describing a 
“need for structural polyphony” within the government). 
261. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2337 n.347. 
262. See supra subpart I(B). 
263. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 250, at 158–63. 
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heads are continuous with the president and Congress is not competing to 
control the bureaucracy.264 
The relative and bounded account Kagan proposed has become more 
totalizing, and thus less plausible, as presidential administration has 
expanded. Responsiveness to the national public’s preferences and interests 
is a critical value for administration—even if not the sole source of 
accountability—but such responsiveness itself requires multiple connections 
between administration and the public.265 Kagan’s resort to a pluralist frame 
underscores that the president may be defended as a principal, but not the 
only, tether between administration and the public. Her invocation of 
unitariness and singular visibility was always premised on an encompassing 
pluralist system. As presidential administration has come to denote broader 
and more autonomous presidential policymaking, however, the “pluralist 
system” in which Kagan sought to situate presidential administration appears 
to exist only, if at all, as an aspect of presidential administration itself. 
This very recognition appears to motivate the recent internal turn in 
administrative law scholarship: lacking plausible political counterweights to 
the president, scholars locate new checks and balances within the 
bureaucracy.266 But accounts that replace the external separation of powers 
and its inherent pluralism with a purely internal separation of powers do not 
involve multiple channels for political representation and specifically 
electoral accountability. The internal turn reflects a broader supposition of 
administrative law scholarship that it is simply not possible to more fully 
conjoin administration and representative democracy.267 
The longstanding state role in presidential administration suggests, 
however, that we may be giving up too easily on this project. States 
 
264. See supra subpart I(B). See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation 
of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) (arguing that the partisan composition of 
Congress and the presidency overshadows the separation of powers as such in determining whether 
the branches will compete). 
265. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 98, at 988–89 (“No single mode of democratic legitimation 
can serve to mediate between the . . . will of the people and the modern regulatory enterprise.”); cf. 
Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1112–
13 (2011) (reviewing ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM (2010)) (arguing that both the resolution of substantive issues and the proper site of 
resolution of these issues should frequently be left to constitutional politics); Victoria Nourse, The 
Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 750–54 (1999) (framing the separation of powers 
and the necessary division of representation among competing institutions as a matter of the various 
political relationships between the people and government officials). 
266. See supra subpart II(B) (describing the internal turn in recent administrative law 
scholarship). 
267. Proposals to merge the two have long tended toward the implausible yet illuminating 
illustration, not the earnest suggestion. E.g., Stewart, supra note 39, at 1791–802 (noting that 
“[p]opular election of agency officials would serve to legitimate the exercise of legislative powers 
by administrative officials by invoking the same formal principle that legitimates the exercise of 
such power by legislators,” but concluding that “[t]he effort to utilize representative principles to 
control and legitimate agency discretion seems ultimately to lead to a dead end”). 
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disaggregate national majoritarian preferences and introduce multiple 
channels of political representation into the administrative sphere.268 For the 
many administrative decisions that demand popular engagement, states may 
render presidential administration itself plural and more broadly 
representative than presidential decisionmaking alone.269 Federalism 
suggests that popular control over governmental decisionmaking is not a 
question of simple majoritarianism versus countermajoritarianism.270 
Consistent with pluralist premises, we need not reduce popular will to a 
single preference—all the more worrisome when this is not a majority 
preference formed through the mutual accommodation of a multimember 
body, but simply the equation of the president with a unitary national 
 
268. In this sense, states act consistently with their celebrated role as laboratories of democracy. 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”). That these laboratories may be functioning as national partisan laboratories does not 
undermine their ability to bring pluralism and diverse political representation into federal 
administration. See generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163, at 1124–30 (exploring states as 
laboratories of partisan politics). In recognizing the states as democratic-administrative units, this 
Article shares commitments with democratic experimentalism and (at least some forms of) new 
governance. See, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1 (Gráinne de Búrca 
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 
(2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). But these theories tend to regard the principal 
administrative challenge as problem-solving amid uncertainty and complexity and to emphasize 
direct democracy and deliberation, not representation and elections. Some of the accounts 
specifically privilege procedure, participation, and transparency as forms of such democratic 
deliberation, thereby tracking the recent internal turn in administrative law scholarship more 
generally. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE 1, 12, 18–21 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan 
Zeitlin eds., 2010) (embracing a shift from principal–agent governance to “peer review through fora, 
networked agencies, councils of regulators, and open methods of coordination,” and emphasizing 
“transparency” and “participation” as democratic requirements); supra subpart II(B). See generally 
PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION-STATE 
264 (2010) (arguing that “decentralized forms of experimentalist governance . . . disciplined by 
transparency, participation, and reason-giving” might yield “technocratic domination without the 
possibility of any kind of plebiscitary leadership, strongly legitimated via representative 
government”). By contrast, this Article seeks more directly to account for today’s polarized politics 
and existing channels of representative government. Instead of anticipating cooperative learning, it 
expects agonistic partisanship. Instead of championing direct deliberation, it focuses on political 
representation. And instead of proposing new institutions, it relies on the ones we have. 
269. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 1009–15 (describing how executive federalism may 
advance democratic representation and focusing on the disaggregated quality of state 
policymaking). 
270. See Bressman, supra note 41, at 481–91 (describing the influence of the majoritarian 
paradigm). 
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constituency.271 Instead, we can understand popular will and majoritarian 
preferences to inhere in the aggregation of multiple policy choices. 
Even an executive-dominated federal system is therefore more broadly 
representative, and potentially responsive to the general electorate, than a 
unitary system insofar as it involves fifty elected governors alongside the 
president.272 These governors are independently responsible to state 
constituents, not mere repositories of federal authority. Moreover, while 
executives exercise an outsized role at the state level as well,273 state 
legislatures also set policy on questions that have been left to agencies at the 
federal level. A number of recent accounts have cast notice-and-comment 
rulemaking as a surrogate for legislation, one that may be necessary to 
counterbalance presidentialism with additional popular inputs, but the 
analogy is necessarily limited.274 State legislatures actually engage in 
lawmaking. When California adopted net-neutrality rules, it did so through 
legislation. When it adopted sanctuary policies limiting cooperation with 
federal immigration enforcement, it did so through legislation. When it 
adopted climate-change regulation, fair-housing regulation, and more, it did 
so through legislation. Policies that had been a matter of purely 
administrative action at the federal level became a matter of legislation at the 
state level, with the sort of electoral representation that defines legislative but 
not administrative bodies.275 And although California has pride of place as 
 
271. For instance, the leading account of popular control over administration prior to 
presidentialism’s ascendancy, interest representation, took the legislative standard as a given; it 
suggested that the legislative process was in broad strokes replicated by interest-group participation 
in administrative processes. When the presidential-administration model dethroned the interest-
representation model, “it changed the locus of popular control from interest groups to the one 
governmental actor responsive to the entire nation.” Id. at 485–86. 
272. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 1009–10. 
273. See Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 (2017); 
see also David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEXAS L. REV. 763, 763 (2017) 
(arguing that cooperative federalism regimes should empower state executives over legislatures 
because gubernatorial elections are less second-order than state legislative elections). 
274. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 93, at 2081; Ross, supra note 108, at 574–75. 
275. See generally David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. 
REV. 19, 19 (“Article I of the Constitution entrusts the legislative power of the United States to 
Congress, so that democratically elected representatives will determine national policy.”); Mark E. 
Warren & Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Negotiation, in AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS’N, NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 86, 87 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013) (“Because 
Congress is composed of many representatives, elected from every part of the country, it . . . can 
come far closer than the executive to representing and communicating with the people in all of their 
plurality.”). But see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 625 (2001) (“[B]road-brush efforts to match the institutional 
competency or normative suitability of a ‘branch’ with the exercise of a particular power are 
destined to fail.”). 
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the “State of Resistance”276 in the Trump era, other states have likewise 
adopted legislation in the place of federal regulation.277 
The distinct set of critics who understand the administrative state to be 
usurping Congress’s authority might respond that state legislatures cannot 
stand in for the federal one. But the case is strong. State legislatures, too, 
advance values associated with representative lawmaking,278 and they are 
arguably more representative than Congress itself.279 Moreover, state 
legislatures today operate with a national, and not merely state-specific, 
orientation. In recent decades, state elections have come to closely mirror 
national elections: when individuals vote for state legislators, they use the 
same partisan heuristics and focus on the same policy issues as when they 
vote for members of Congress.280 As Congress has been absent from major 
policy decisions—from protection for Dreamers to deportation, Medicaid 
expansion to work requirements, climate change regulation to its repeal—
state legislators have taken sides, and state voters have both spurred and 
reacted to this role.281 State elections have become plausible substitutes for 
 
276. MANUEL PASTOR, STATE OF RESISTANCE: WHAT CALIFORNIA’S DIZZYING DESCENT AND 
REMARKABLE RESURGENCE MEAN FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2018). 
277. See, e.g., supra notes 11–16; supra subpart IV(A). In addition to legislation, many states 
use ballot initiatives and referenda, which may furnish possibilities for less mediated popular 
authorship as well. Like other aspects of state democracy, the initiative and referendum process is 
easy to criticize—subject to special-interest capture, prey to voter ignorance and misinformation—
but it is a powerful, existing mechanism for popular participation, and recent initiatives concerning 
criminal law, voting, and healthcare provide some fresh support for the “when the people lead, the 
leaders will follow” school of thought. Stephen Wolf, Here’s How 2018 Ballot Measures Turned 
Out on Health Care, Criminal Justice, Climate, and More, DAILY KOS (Dec. 3, 2018, 1:42 PM), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/12/3/1814022/-Here-s-how-2018-ballot-measures-turned-
out-on-health-care-criminal-justice-climate-and-more [https://perma.cc/P2WZ-AKT5] (compiling 
November 2018 ballot initiatives). 
278. E.g., NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY 
(2006); Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335 (2009). 
279. Vicki C. Jackson, The Democratic Deficit of United States Federalism? Red State, Blue 
State, Purple?, 46 FEDERAL L. REV. 645, 652 (2018) (“Based on the one-person, one-vote principle, 
state legislatures and Governors now have an arguably stronger claim to democratic legitimacy in 
representing the people of their respective states than does the Congress in representing the people 
of the United States.”). 
280. See generally DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY 
AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED (2018) (explaining that Americans use the same 
criteria to choose candidates across state and national elections and are engaged with national more 
than state and local political questions); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163 (arguing that states are sites 
of national partisan policymaking and national partisan affiliation). 
281. For example, in “blue” New York State, Republicans had controlled the state Senate almost 
continuously since the 1970s, but in 2018 a campaign focused on national issues including health 
care, immigration, and climate change yielded high voter turnout and flipped seats so that 
Democrats assumed a trifecta. See, e.g., The Creative Resistance, Lulu Land, YOUTUBE (Oct. 24, 
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mESf-kjuSI [https://perma.cc/89S9-FHMV] 
(describing insurgent campaign attempting to focus state primary election on national issues); 
Vivian Wang, Democrats Take Control of New York Senate for First Time in Decade, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/nyregion/democrat-ny-senate.html [https://
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federal elections. The nationalizing of state politics may threaten certain 
traditional values of federalism,282 but it facilitates pluralist 
intergovernmental presidential administration. 
B. Effectiveness 
Even assuming presidential administration served “democratic norms,” 
Kagan’s account further insisted, it should also be measured against the 
arguably conflicting standard of regulatory effectiveness, by which she meant 
especially “a certain kind of dynamism or energy in administration, which 
entails both the capacity and the willingness to adopt, modify, or revoke 
regulations, with a fair degree of expedition, to solve perceived national 
problems.”283 Here again, Kagan maintained, the president had the 
comparative edge. As a single individual, he could “act without the 
indecision and inefficiency that so often characterize the behavior of 
collective entities”; as the head of the entire executive branch, he could 
coordinate the work of multiple agencies and set coherent regulatory 
priorities; and as an electorally accountable actor, he could “energize 
regulatory policy.”284 
Kagan was well aware that “energy in the executive”285 might just as 
easily be framed as “tyranny” and a departure from constitutional checks and 
balances.286 But she maintained that “modern political developments,” 
particularly increasing periods of divided-party government, had yielded “a 
greater need for energy in government.”287 Political gridlock and 
administrative ossification could only be overcome by a powerful 
president—and the risk of excessive unilateral power would itself be 
contained by the president’s political accountability and the “inevitably” 
pluralist system she had likewise resorted to in defending such 
accountability.288 
As with the accountability argument, the extension of the trends Kagan 
addressed—particularly with respect to partisan polarization and 
congressional gridlock—has rendered this hedge less convincing. Prominent 
 
perma.cc/2PXS-W9GAA] (“The Democrats had campaigned on a decidedly Washington-focused 
message, latching on to the language of a national ‘blue wave’ and promising to strike back at the 
Trump administration.”). In its first session, the newly elected New York government passed 
significant legislation with respect to abortion, immigration, climate change, voting, LGBTQ rights, 
and more. See Bills & Laws, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation [https://
perma.cc/NB94-55HJ] (compiling recent legislation). 
282. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 273. 
283. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2339. 
284. Id. at 2339, 2341. 
285. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”). 
286. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2342–43. 
287. Id. at 2343–44. 
288. Id. at 2337 n.347, 2345–46. 
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critiques argue that the balance has swung too far in favor of executive 
power,289 and in the age of Trump, the risks of an unchecked president loom 
particularly large.290 
Less apparent, but in some respects a more direct challenge to Kagan’s 
own account than the threat of unilateral executive power, presidential 
administration in an age of polarization may not be very effective, at least in 
the sense of producing policy results. Presidents have been relying more and 
more heavily on agencies to set domestic policy—but in so doing, they come 
up against limits on agency power.291 Even when presidential control over 
agencies is no obstacle, these agencies themselves may not possess sufficient 
authority to advance the president’s regulatory agenda. The limits on 
effectiveness are still more pronounced over time. As Mashaw and Berke 
note in considering the transition from one president to the next, “energy” 
may come to “seem like a Sisyphean doing and undoing of the same 
policies—an expensive repetition that thwarts the policy goals motivating 
both the enactment and rescission.”292 Regulatory whiplash is not a useful 
sort of vigor. 
States may ameliorate each of these problems—the risk of unchecked 
authority; the president’s inability to achieve policy goals in the first instance; 
and the president’s inability to confer staying power on her policies. Perhaps 
most apparent, and consistent with longstanding celebrations of federalism 
as a check on national power, states introduce pluralism and outright 
contestation into the administrative domain. When the president is not the 
only political author of administrative policy, the risk of energy as unchecked 
authority is diminished. Of course, with this check also comes a 
diminishment in presidential energy itself. The president is no longer a 
unitary, dynamic actor responsible for setting policy; instead, fifty other 
governments have a role. But, much as states complicate concepts of a 
national majoritarian policy preference through disaggregation, so too can 
they complicate the idea of energy. The president may be less energetic and 
effective in certain jurisdictions, but she will be more so in others. 
Indeed, it is important to recognize states as an extension of, and not 
only a check on, presidential power. Successful presidential administration is 
what raises the specter of tyranny, but presidential administration fails on its 
own terms if it does not entail viable presidential policymaking. State 
cooperation addresses the latter problem, even as state opposition speaks to 
the former. States allow presidents to advance policies that federal agencies 
themselves may lack authority to adopt. Recall, for example, how on Kagan’s 
own account, President Clinton could not implement his youth-smoking or 
 
289. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 250. 
290. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 18. 
291. See supra section IV(A)(1). 
292. Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10, at 610. 
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family-leave policies without the states; federal agencies lacked sufficient 
authority.293 States were even more critical to President Obama’s major 
initiatives.294 
Moreover, these states may furnish durability to administrative 
policymaking that federal agencies cannot.295 Durability itself might seem to 
cut against “energy”; Kagan’s account included modification and revocation 
as hallmarks of the dynamism she celebrated. And if the alternative is 
stasis—as suggested by Kagan’s emphasis on divided government and 
administrative ossification—then perhaps even regulatory whiplash is to be 
preferred. Certainly it is more “energetic” than inaction pure and simple. But 
states suggest we need not be limited by this dichotomy. Because there are 
numerous states, they enable multiple forms of activity, severing any 
assumed connection between action and unitariness. Moreover, while state 
institutions, particularly legislatures, are often themselves collective bodies, 
the prevalence of unified party government at the state level means that states 
act more readily than accounts of inefficient collective bodies suggest.296 
More generally, intergovernmental presidential administration 
highlights tradeoffs with respect to time and space: reduced geographical 
scope for a policy may yield greater staying power, and vice versa. At any 
given moment, fifty states yield greater variation than the federal 
government. If a leading benefit of administrative governance is national 
uniformity, and orderliness and predictability that even federal courts cannot 
provide,297 the variety, even chaos, of multiple state policies appears 
discordant with this objective. But the equation of federalism with 
inconsistency and of federal administration with consistency assumes a 
particular moment. Over time, particular states may in fact generate greater 
consistency and, with it, longer lifespans for policy development. 
The combination of political polarization and presidential dominance 
within the federal government means that administrative decisions may be 
dramatically modified with every new presidential election.298 Recall the 
Trump Administration’s response to President Obama’s policies: the Clean 
Power Plan, net-neutrality rules, and DACA and DAPA—among numerous 
other agency actions—have all been withdrawn.299 But things are not that 
simple outside Washington. Even as allied states have amplified both 
 
293. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text. 
295. Again, the Obama–Trump transition is illustrative. See supra notes 11–16 and 
accompanying text; supra subpart IV(B). 
296. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2339 (noting the “indecision and inefficiency that so 
often characterize the behavior of collective entities”). 
297. E.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1105 (1987). 
298. See, e.g., Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10, at 607. 
299. See supra notes 1–6, 180–86 and accompanying text. 
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President Obama’s and President Trump’s policy choices, opposed states 
have limited each chief executive’s reach. The sheer number of states and 
extent of current partisan division means that states will themselves be 
divided on policy questions. And as some states perpetuate the commitments 
of a prior presidential administration, they can render federally fragile 
policies more resilient within their borders. 
Conclusion 
We still “live today in an era of presidential administration.”300 Political 
and doctrinal obstacles to presidentialism have been removed by an 
executive-centered party system and a judicial embrace of presidential 
control over agencies. Yet the very strength of presidential administration in 
Washington yields vulnerabilities. Policies emerge from agency action, but 
they are readily undone when the presidency changes hands. Courts insist on 
greater presidential identity with agency policymaking, but they also limit 
the scope of such policymaking. 
Federalism complicates this picture. States enhance presidential 
administration, allowing presidents to realize policy objectives beyond 
federal agencies’ capacity and furnishing a degree of stability in the face of 
federal regulatory whiplash. But states also oppose presidential decisions and 
introduce new forms of pluralism and representation to the administrative 
sphere. Scholars worried about aggrandized presidential power are 
increasingly looking to bureaucracy and administrative procedure. Yet while 
expertise, deliberation, and reason-giving are critical to the administrative 
state’s legitimacy, these internal values do not tie administration to 
representative politics—an imperative not only of administrative authority 
but also of democratic governance in an age of administration. States provide 
additional channels for political responsiveness in a president-dominant 
system: instead of a single elected official, the administrative domain 
includes fifty governors and more than seven thousand legislators. In the 
decades ahead, administrative states, not a unitary administrative state, are 
our best hope of marrying democracy and bureaucracy. 
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